Fortress Kaliningrad Ever closer to Moscow. OSW Point of View, October 2019 by Team, OSW
Fortress Kaliningrad
EvEr closEr to Moscow
osw team
Fortress Kaliningrad
EvEr closEr to Moscow
osw team
wArsAw
octoBEr 2019
© copyright by ośrodek studiów wschodnich im. Marka Karpia / centre for Eastern studies
Authors
Maria Domańska, szymon Kardaś, Marek Menkiszak, Jadwiga rogoża, Andrzej wilk, 
Iwona wiśniewska, Piotr Żochowski
contEnt EDItor
Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak, wojciech stanisławski
EDItor
halina Kowalczyk
co-oPErAtIon
Anna Łabuszewska, szymon sztyk
trAnslAtIon
osw
co-oPErAtIon
nicholas Furnival
MAPs AnD chArts
urszula Gumińska-Kurek, wojciech Mańkowski
GrAPhIc DEsIGn 
PArA-Buch
PhotoGrAPh on covEr
cinemavue/shutterstock.com
DtP
GroupMedia
PuBlIshEr
ośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
centre for Eastern studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, warsaw, Poland
Phone: /+ 48/ 22 525 80 00
Fax: /+ 48/ 22 525 80 40
www.osw.waw.pl
IsBn 978-83-65827-43-2
contents
MAIN POINTS  /5
INTrOducTION  /10
I. PolItIcAl AnD socIAl sItuAtIon AnD IntErnAl PolIcy  /13
1. The political situation: balance of power in the regional elite  /13
2. Political opposition and repression  /20
3. Public sentiments and social activity  /22
4. regional identity and the so-called Germanisation problem  /25
II. EconoMIc sItuAtIon AnD PolIcy In thE KAlInInGrAD 
oBlAst  /30
1. Social and economic situation  /30
2. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the economic policy of Moscow /34
III.  thE KAlInInGrAD oBlAst AnD Its ExtErnAl EnvIronMEnt  /52
1. cross-border political relations  /52
2. cross-border travel  /58
3. Economic relations  /60
IV. sEcurIty AnD DEFEncE sItuAtIon AnD PolIcy 
In thE KAlInInGrAD oBlAst  /67
1. Situation within the security institutions and their activities   /67
2. Military situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast  /71
cONcluSION: OuTlOOK   /80
APPENdIcES  /83
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
5
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 1
0/
20
19
MAIN POINTS
•	 Moscow’s	 policy	 towards	 the	 Kaliningrad	 Oblast	 has	 been	 increasingly	
consistent	 in	recent	years.	 Its	main	objective	has	been	to	further	tighten	
its	grip	on	the	region	and	its	links	to	mainland	Russia	in	the	political,	so-
cial	and	economic	dimension.	As	a	result,	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	has	been	
made	more	subordinated	to	Moscow,	which	is	in	line	with	a	general	trend	
in	the	relations	between	Russia’s	central	government	and	the	regions.	
•	 In	 2017	 Anton	 Alikhanov,	 a	 Moscow	 designate,	 formally	 confirmed	 his	
political	mandate	to	hold	the	position	of	 the	governor	of	 the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast	 in	 elections	which	were	 de facto	 non-competitive.	 Alikhanov	 has	
since	dismantled	the	pre-existing	political	and	business	structures	in	the	
oblast	and	rid	himself	of	political	competitors.	Power	in	the	region	has	be-
come	centralised	and	concentrated	in	the	hands	of	the	governor.	However,	
Alikhanov’s	role	is	that	of	a	caretaker	tasked	with	safeguarding	the	region-
al	interests	of	actors	with	close	links	to	the	Kremlin.	In	some	cases	these	
clash	with	the	interests	of	the	regional	elite.
•	 Public	 sentiment	 in	 the	 oblast	 regarding	 social	 and	 economic	 issues	has	
been	consistently	deteriorating,	but	 this	has	not	generated	much	protest	
activity.	The	people	and	the	regional	elite	seem	to	be	passively	accepting	
Moscow’s	policy	and	Governor	Alikhanov.	The	political	opposition	 in	 the	
region	 remains	weak	 and	divided.	However,	many	grassroots	 social	 ini-
tiatives	are	still	active	 in	 the	oblast,	most	of	 them	apolitical	and	 focused	
on	the	protection	of	cultural	heritage	or	the	environment	and	on	cultural	
or	charitable	activities.	On	Moscow’s	initiative,	efforts	have	been	made	to	
suppress	this	social	activity	and	undermine	the	Kaliningrad	identity	–	in-
cluding	a	campaign	 to	counter	 ‘Germanisation’.	However,	despite	 the	re-
gion’s	unique	geopolitical	position	and	efforts	by	the	special	services	to	pro-
mote	the	‘besieged	fortress’	narrative,	the	level	of	repression	in	the	oblast	is	
similar	to	the	Russian	average.
•	 The	improved	economic	conditions	in	Russia	and	the	influx	of	federal	funds	
into	the	region	in	connection	with	the	organisation	of	the	2018	World	Cup	
and	other	projects,	 have	boosted	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	macroeconomic	
performance,	especially	during	the	last	two	years.	However,	the	public	has	
not	benefited	 from	the	economic	growth	as	 real	 incomes	continued	 to	de-
crease,	following	the	trend	seen	for	several	years.	As	a	result,	the	standards	
of	living	in	the	oblast	have	been	declining	and	are	below	the	Russian	average.
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•	 The	Kremlin	has	stepped	up	control	of	the	region’s	economy	by	making	its	
revenues	even	more	dependent	on	transfers	from	the	federal	budget	and	
increasing	the	presence	of	federal	companies	implementing	large	projects	
related	to	the	expansion	of	the	energy	infrastructure	(new	power	plants,	
the	floating	LNG	terminal)	and	the	regional	transport	infrastructure	(the	
expansion	 of	 ports,	 the	 airport	 and	 ferry	 links).	 Those	 projects,	 which	
mainly	benefited	people	from	President	Putin’s	inner	circle,	increased	the	
region’s	self-sufficiency	and	in	this	way	made	 it	even	more	 isolated.	This	
contrasted	 with	 the	 Kremlin’s	 activities	 to	 foster	 co-operation	 with	 the	
neighbours,	such	as	the	creation	of	a	transport	and	logistics	centre,	plans	
to	promote	tourism	(e.g.	by	introducing	electronic	visas)	and	cross-border	
co-operation	projects.	
•	 Despite	Russia’s	worsening	political	relations	with	Poland	and	Lithuania,	
dialogue	at	the	regional	political	and	local-governmental	level	has	contin-
ued.	Cross-border	co-operation	projects	co-financed	by	the	EU	under	the	
2014–2020	budget	are	being	implemented.	
•	 Kaliningrad	residents	are	very	mobile	–	the	percentage	of	people	holding	
passports	is	twice	as	high	in	that	oblast	as	the	Russian	average.	People	from	
Kaliningrad	Oblast	 travel	most	 frequently	 to	 the	neighbouring	EU	coun-
tries,	drawn	by	the	lower	prices	and	better	quality	of	products.	However,	
the	intensity	of	travel	to	Poland	and	Lithuania,	and	the	volume	of	purchas-
es	in	those	countries,	have	decreased	recently,	mostly	because	of	the	depre-
ciation	of	the	rouble	(after	2014)	and	the	suspension	(in	2016)	of	the	local	
border	traffic	regime	which	made	crossing	the	border	with	Poland	easier	
and	less	expensive.
•	 As	tensions	in	Russia’s	relations	with	the	West	increased,	the	Russian	spe-
cial	 services	have	stepped	up	 their	defensive	and	offensive	activities	 in	
this	region	whose	location	Moscow	regards	as	strategic.	Defensive	activi-
ties	have	been	focused	on	preventing	a	further	loosening	of	the	oblast’s	
links	 with	 Russia,	 while	 offensive	 activities	 involved	 monitoring	 and	
countering	NATO’s	activities,	as	well	as	political	lobbying.	The	reshuffles	
in	the	regional	directorates	of	the	institutions	of	force	have	been	aimed	
at	strengthening	discipline	and	reigning	in	corruption	schemes	or	taking	
control	of	them.	
•	 Russia	has	stepped	up	efforts	to	modernise	and	expand	its	military	poten-
tial	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	achieving	a	noticeable	improvement	of	the	
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offensive	capabilities	of	the	Kaliningrad-based	units	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	
the	Russian	Federation.	Those	efforts	have	involved:
1. expanding military infrastructures (including the expansion of the 
military airfield and upgrades of nuclear weapons depots), 
2. increasing the presence of military personnel (including the re-activa-
tion of a tank regiment and a fighter aviation division),
3. further technological upgrades (including the permanent deployment of 
the Iskander missile systems, expansion of the coastal defence Bastion 
missile systems, deployment of additional fighter aircraft, helicopters, 
tanks and warships), and 
4. increased training activities (including drills with offensive scenarios). 
The	Russian	air	 force	and	navy	based	 in	Kaliningrad	have	also	continued	 to	
stage	provocations	against	the	forces	of	NATO	countries.
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Map 1. Kaliningrad in Europe
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INTrOducTION
The	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	a	Russian	exclave	separated	from	the	Russian	Fed-
eration	by	the	territories	of	Poland	and	Lithuania	(both	of	which	are	EU	and	
NATO	member	 states)	 and	 of	 Belarus.	 It	 is	 the	 only	 part	 of	 Russia	 that	 has	
a	border	with	Poland	and	Lithuania.	 Its	geopolitical	 location	makes	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	an	important	Russian	outpost	in	the	northern	part	of	Central	Eu-
rope.	It	is	therefore	strategically	important	for	Russia,	as	well	as	for	Poland	and	
Lithuania	and	the	entire	region.	For	this	reason,	the	Centre	for	Eastern	Studies	
(OSW)	considers	monitoring	 the	political,	 social,	economic,	energy,	 security	
and	military	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	to	be	one	of	the	priority	areas	
of	its	analytic	work.	
In	 recent	 years	 OSW	 has	 published	 two	 major	 studies	 on	 the	 Kaliningrad	
Oblast:	 in	2012	 it	published:	A captive island: Kaliningrad between Moscow and 
the EU	as	part	of	the	“OSW	Studies”	series,	and	in	2016	it	followed	up	with	the	
report	Kaliningrad Oblast 2016. The society, economy and army.	Because	 impor-
tant	new	developments	have	 taken	place	 in	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	between	
2016	and	2019	in	the	political,	economic	and	military	dimension,	OSW	decided	
to	produce	a	new	report	on	the	subject.
The	purpose	of	the	present	paper	is	to	analyse	the	most	important	changes	that	
have	taken	place	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	since	the	publication	of	the	last	re-
port.	Therefore,	the	present	report	will	not	repeat	basic	information	about	the	
region	which	was	provided	in	the	previous	reports.	It	will	instead	focus	on	an	
in-depth	analysis	of	how	the	situation	has	evolved	in	the	different	dimensions	
that	are	of	interest	here.	The	text	is	divided	into	four	parts.	
Part	One	analyses	the	dynamics	of	the	political	and	social	situation	with	spe-
cial	 focus	 on:	 changes	 in	 the	 relations	 between	 the	 federal	 centre	 and	 the	
oblast;	the	situation	within	the	power	elite;	and	the	development	of	civil	soci-
ety	activities.	
Part	Two	is	devoted	to	analysing	the	economic	situation	and	looks	in	particular	
into	social	and	economic	 indicators	and	the	evolution	of	Moscow’s	policy	to-
wards	the	region,	including	its	transport	and	energy	projects.	
Part	Three	delves	 into	the	oblast’s	relations	with	the	external	world,	 includ-
ing	its	cross-border	contacts	and	co-operations,	the	movement	of	people	and	
economic	exchange.	
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Finally,	Part	Four	is	devoted	to	the	evolution	of	the	internal	security	situation	
and	policy,	and	the	expansion	of	Russia’s	military	potential	in	the	region.	Ap-
pendices	with	additional	detailed	data	on	selected	topics	complement	the	text.	
One	aim	of	the	report	is	enhance	the	knowledge	which	Polish	and	foreign	audi-
ences	have	about	the	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	its	role	in	the	pol-
icy	of	the	Russian	Federation.	A	further	aim	is	to	contribute	to	a	wider	analysis	
of	Russia’s	policy	and	public	debate	on	this	subject.
Interesting facts about Kaliningrad 
The Polish poet Jan Kochanowski (1530–1584) visited the Albertus Univer-
sity of Königsberg (Albertus-Universität Königsberg) in the years 1551–1552 
and 1555–1556. 
The first book in Lithuanian – The Catechism (Katekizmo paprasti žodžiai), au-
thored by Martynas Mažvydas, was published in Königsberg in January 1547.
The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), who was born and 
lived in Königsberg, swore allegiance to the Empress Elisabeth of Russia af-
ter the Russian army seized the city in 1758 in the course of the Seven Years’ 
War. When the province was restored to Prussia four years later, Kant did 
not want to retract his oath and formally remained a Russian subject till 
the end of his life. 
The Königsberg castle is where the original Amber Room was last seen.
Between April 1945 (capture by the Red Army) and July 1946, Kalinin-
grad bore the Russian version of its previous German name: Königsberg 
(Кёнигсберг). In April 1946 the Königsberg Oblast of the RSFSR was created 
(renamed as the Kaliningrad Oblast in July 1946). 
Mikhail Kalinin, after whom the oblast’s capital was named in 1946, never 
visited the city of Kaliningrad or the region. As the president of the So-
viet Union’s Supreme Soviet (1938–1946), Kalinin was co-responsible for 
mass crimes – his signature can be found on hundreds of execution lists 
including the Katyn execution list. In the years 1931–1990, the city of Tver 
was named Kalinin. Tver is the capital of the Tver Oblast where in 1940 the 
NKVD murdered 6,300 Polish prisoners of war who were subsequently 
buried in Mednoye. 
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The Kaliningrad Oblast accounts for 90% of global amber reserves. Accord-
ing to folk medicine, amber beads worn around the neck prevent a sore 
throat and headaches while also keeping the thyroid healthy. The largest 
known lump of amber kept at Kaliningrad’s Amber Museum weighs four 
kilograms. Also on display at the Museum is an amber mosaic titled Rus, 
which weighs more than 70 kg. 
Kaliningrad has the highest number of beauty parlours per capita in Russia. 
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I. POlITIcAl ANd SOcIAl SITuATION ANd 
INTerNAl POlIcy 
1. The political situation: balance of power in the regional elite
A	qualitative	change	has	occurred	in	the	governance	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	
in	recent	years,	affecting	both	the	internal	regional	governance	and	the	rela-
tions	between	the	oblast	and	Moscow.	The	regional	elite	has	become	much	less	
pluralistic:	the	previous	model	in	which	the	mayor	of	Kaliningrad	competed	
for	influence	with	the	governor	has	been	replaced	by	a	centralised	model	with	
power	concentrated	in	the	governor’s	hands.	The	governor,	however,	is	not	an	
independent	politician,	but	rather	a	technocratic	caretaker	overseeing	the	in-
terests	of	federal	political	and	business	actors	in	the	region.	This	arrangement	
is	in	keeping	with	the	strategy	which	the	Kremlin	has	been	implementing	for	
years	to	tighten	its	control	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	subjects.	
On 10 September 2017, Anton Alikhanov, who had been acting as the re-
gion’s chief since 6 October 2016, was elected as the governor of the Ka-
liningrad Oblast in a general election.	According	to	available	 information	
he	has	links	to	Viktor	Chemezov,	the	influential	CEO	of	the	state-owned	Ros-
tec	corporation	(Rostec	owns	the	Kaliningrad	Amber	Combine).	Alikhanov	so	
far	enjoys	strong	support	from	the	Presidential	Administration	(according	to	
some	sources,	he	is	a	protégé	of	the	administration’s	deputy	chief	in	charge	of	
its	internal	policy	division,	Sergey	Kiriyenko).	
Governor Anton Alikhanov
Anton Alikhanov, the governor of the Kaliningrad Oblast, was born in 1986 
in Sukhumi (Abkhazian ASSR). He is a lawyer and holds a PhD in economics. 
He comes from a wealthy family. His father Andrey was one of the founders 
of Rosmyasomoltorg, a large food processing company in which he holds 
20% of the shares. Andrey Alikhanov is friends with Igor Shuvalov – the 
former deputy prime minister of Russia, current chairman of State Devel-
opment Corporation VB.RF, and Mikhail Babich – the former president’s 
plenipotentiary in the Volga Federal District and current deputy minister 
of economic development. 
In 2010 Anton Alikhanov started working at the Ministry of Justice, and in 
2013 – at the Ministry of Industry and Trade where he served as the direc-
tor of the Department for the Regulation of Foreign Co-operation (among 
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other posts). On 22 September 2015 he was appointed deputy prime minis-
ter of the Kaliningrad Oblast (in charge of agriculture and industry). Less 
than a year later, on 30 July 2016, he was promoted to the function of acting 
prime minister of the region, a position that was restored especially for him 
by the then newly appointed acting governor Yevgeny Zinichev (during the 
term of the previous governor Nikolai Tsukanov, the regional government 
was headed by the governor). On 6 October 2016, President Vladimir Putin 
entrusted Alikhanov with the function of acting governor of the Kalinin-
grad region (at the same time, the traditional model in which the head of 
the region heads the regional government was reinstated). Alikhanov be-
came the youngest regional governor in recent Russian history.
In the gubernatorial elections on 10 September 2017, Alikhanov had no real 
competitors, and the campaign proceeded without any problems, thanks to 
the traditional use of the so-called administrative resource (administra-
tive control over the campaign and voting), cooperation on the part of the 
‘licensed opposition’, and the weakness of the actual opposition in the re-
gion. Apart from him, only technical candidates competed, including Igor 
Revin, a Communist member of the regional parliament, Yevgeny Mishin, 
a regional MP representing the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia, and 
Yekaterina Timofeyeva of the marginal Russian Green Ecological Party. 
Alikhanov officially won 81% of the vote – a record-breaking victory in the 
history of the Kaliningrad Oblast (his predecessor Tsukanov won 70.4% in 
2015 with a similar turnout of slightly over 39%). Alikhanov’s official result 
of 76.24% was the lowest, though still very high, in the region’s capital city 
of Kaliningrad. According to Golos, the independent organisation which 
monitors the elections in Russia, violations of procedures during the count-
ing of votes in the Kaliningrad region were ‘massive’ and ‘catastrophic’.1
From the start, Alikhanov’s role in the Kaliningrad Oblast has been to mod-
ify the region’s political governance model,	i.e.	to	dismantle	the	established	
political	and	business	relations,	including	the	entrenched	corruption	schemes,	
and	centralise	decision	making	(concentrate	major	prerogatives	in	the	hands	of	
the	regional	executive	at	the	expense	of	the	municipal	authorities).	
The local elite was not happy when an outsider, who	had	never	been	connect-
ed	with	the	Kaliningrad	region	and	who	probably	did	not	intend	to	associate	
1	 ‘Выборы	в	Калининграде:	подкуп	и	катастрофический	подсчет’,	Голос,	11.09.2017.
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himself	with	Kaliningrad	in	the	future,	was	appointed	to	the	top	position	in	
the	region.	The	ambitious	Alikhanov	saw	working	in	Kaliningrad	as	a	kind	of	
‘exile’,	but	also	a	springboard	that	would	allow	him	to	return	to	his	federal	ca-
reer. In	the	perception	of	the	regional	elites,	this	meant	that	he	would	only	look	
after	the	interests	of	the	region,	including	those	of	the	local	interest	groups,	
as	much	as	would	be	necessary	to	win	the	Kremlin’s	appreciation. Moscow’s 
interests in the region, represented primarily by Alikhanov and the se-
curity institutions, are – as in the case of other regions of Russia – often 
contrary to the interests of local elites, especially when it comes to defin-
ing the region’s budget or controlling regional assets, including proceeds 
from corruption.
In the years 2017–2018 the balance of power in the Kaliningrad Oblast’s 
regional elite changed, mainly as a result of: 
1. the dismissal of Nikolai Tsukanov, the former governor of the Kalinin-
grad Oblast, from his position as the Russian president’s plenipotentiary in 
the North-western Federal District (NWFD), as a result of which he lost his 
sway over the Kaliningrad elite and the situation in the oblast; 
2. the dismissal of Kaliningrad Mayor Alexander yaroshuk (who in the 
past has competed for influence with successive governors including Anton 
Alikhanov);
3. to	a	lesser	extent	–	the dismissals of the heads of several municipal dis-
tricts in the oblast, who held their functions before Alikhanov’s term began. 
The dismissal of Tsukanov in	December	2017	ended	his	conflict	with	Alikh-
anov	dating	back	to	the	latter’s	appointment	as	acting	governor.	As	the	Krem-
lin’s	plenipotentiary	in	the	NWFD,	Tsukanov	indeed	had	less	power	than	he	
used	to	have	as	the	Kaliningrad	governor	(the	function	of	the	plenipotentiar-
ies	has	increasingly	been	more	about	representation	than	decision-making	in	
recent	years).	His	ability	to	influence	the	leaders	of	the	different	regions	of	the	
NWFD	was	limited,	but	he	nonetheless	considered	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	his	
fiefdom,	not	only	because	he	was	a	Kaliningrad	native,	but	also	because	he	had	
left	behind	an	extensive	network	of	business	 interests,	 including	 sources	of	
proceeds	from	corruption.	Those	business	interests	came	under	threat	the	mo-
ment	he	was	forced	to	resign	as	governor	in	July	2016,	less	than	a	year	after	hav-
ing	won	another	election.	Because	of	his	concern	that	Alikhanov	might	reveal	
his	financial	abuses,	Tsukanov	tried	to	discredit	him	in	the	eyes	of	the	Kremlin	
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(with	allegations	of,	 inter	alia,	 ‘incompetence’	 in	social	policy).	According	to	
some	sources,	Tsukanov	was	so	fiercely	opposed	to	Alikhanov’s	candidacy	in	
the	governor	elections	in	September	2017	that	he	lobbied	in	Moscow	for	the	Ka-
liningrad	mayor	Alexander	Yaroshuk,	whom	he	disliked,	to	be	designated	as	
the	Kremlin’s	candidate.	However,	the	priority	for	the	Kremlin	was	to	step	up	
control	over	the	economy	and	finances	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	ensure	
the	region’s	stability.	In	the	end	the	conflict	was	resolved	by	dismissing	Tsu-
kanov	from	his	position	in	the	NWFD	(currently	he	serves	as	the	president’s	
plenipotentiary	in	the	Ural	Federal	District).	
Alikhanov’s	position	was	 further	strengthened	by	 the	dismissal of the Ka-
liningrad mayor Alexander Yaroshuk, an	ambitious	regional	politician	and	
entrepreneur,	in	March	2018,	i.e.	less	than	six	months	after	he	was	re-elected.	
According	to	one	version	of	events,	his	departure	was	the	result	of	a	compro-
mise.	The	mayor,	who	was	inconvenient	for	Alikhanov,	allegedly	agreed	to	re-
sign	after	successfully	completing	the	construction	of	the	Kaliningrad	stadi-
um	and	ensuring	a	good	result	for	Vladimir	Putin	in	the	region’s	capital	in	the	
presidential	election.	In	the	2018	by-elections,	Yaroshuk	won	a	mandate	in	the	
State	Duma,	which	formally	put	him	in	a	higher	position	and	provided	protec-
tion	thanks	to	the	immunity	of	deputies,	while	Alikhanov,	having	established	
himself	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	had	rid	himself	of	a	competitor.	Alikhanov	
also	made	 sure	 to	weaken	 the	 institutional	powers	of	 the	Kaliningrad	may-
or.	On	his	initiative,	in	November	2016	the	regional	parliament	adopted	a	law	
abolishing	direct	elections	of	the	mayor	in	favour	of	election	by	the	city	coun-
cil.	According	to	Alikhanov	himself,	the	project	fitted	into	a	“general	federal	
trend”	(indeed,	in	2018	mayors	were	still	elected	in	direct	elections	in	only	ten	
Russian	cities),	and	its	roots	lay	in	the	“long-standing	rivalry	between	regional	
and	municipal	authorities”	in	Kaliningrad,	“resulting	in,	among	other	things,	
the	city’s	problems	with	raising	funds	for	infrastructure	projects”.	Thus,	the	
mayor	was	not	only	deprived	of	his	electoral	mandate,	which	weakened	his	po-
litical	importance,	but	has	also	became	much	more	dependent	on	the	support	
of	the	regional	authorities.	Unlike	Yaroshuk,	the new mayor Alexei Silanov 
is not a political player.	He	was	considered	a	compromise	candidate	and	ac-
cepted	by	all	the	main	interest	groups,	which	may	help	stabilise	the	sentiments	
within	the	regional	elite.
Meanwhile,	the	power	and	business	relations	within	the	regional	elite	have	
visibly	weakened	and regional governance has become more centralised 
as municipal authorities were stripped of some of their powers,	e.g.	 in	
the	area	of	 spatial	development	 (building	permits)	 or	public	procurement.	
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The	bill	on	depriving	the	municipal	level	of	powers	in	the	field	of	construc-
tion	entered	into	force	in	January	2017,	so	it	was	one	of	the	earliest	decisions	
of	the	newly	appointed	acting	governor	and	was	justified	by	the	need	for	bet-
ter	urban	planning	and	also	by	the	need	to	combat	corruption.	A	partial	re-
shuffle	has	 also	 taken	place	 among	 the	heads	 of	municipal	units,	with	 the	
mayors	of	Gusev	(who	had	close	links	to	Tsukanov),	Krasnoznamensk,	Svetl-
ogorsk	and	other	towns	losing	their	positions.	Criminal	cases	were	initiated	
(on	charges	of	abuse	and	embezzlement)	against	the	mayors	of	the	towns	of	
Svetly	and	Sovetsk.	
As he stepped up control of the regional elite, Alikhanov has nonetheless 
pursued a balanced appointments policy	as	a	gesture	to	 the	native	Kalin-
ingrad	elites.	The	fears	that	the	new	governor	would	strip	members	of	the	re-
gional	elite	of	their	influence	in	the	regional	administration	did	at	first	seem	
justified.	However,	Alikhanov’s	appointments	to	date	rather	indicate	that	he	
is	taking	care	to	entrust	the	highest	positions	to	people	born	in	the	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	or	those	who	have	been	associated	with	the	region	for	a	long	time.	
While	the	first	deputy	prime	minister	Alexei	Rodin,	formally	responsible	for	
regional	security	and	the	administrative	apparatus	(including	appointments)	
is	Alikhanov’s	 trusted	 aide	 from	his	Moscow	 times,	 nearly	 all	 other	 deputy	
prime	ministers	and	two	thirds	of	ministers	are	people	who	have	been	associ-
ated	with	the	region	for	years	and,	in	many	cases,	have	previously	worked	in	
the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	government	or	in	the	municipal	bodies.	Some	deputy	
prime	ministers	and	ministers	have	been	serving	in	their	positions	since	the	
times	of	the	previous	governors.	
Alikhanov has probably been so careful in navigating his way among the 
regional elite for	two	reasons.	Firstly,	his	personal	and	professional	ambition	
is	to	prove	his	worth	in	front	of	the	Kremlin	as	a	successful	leader	of	a	difficult	
region	of	crucial	geostrategic	importance	and	the	one	remaining	under	tight	
control	of	the	secret	services.	Secondly,	like	many	other	‘technocratic’	gover-
nors	appointed	in	recent	years,	Alikhanov	is	not	a	political	player	but	rather	
a	medium-level	nomenklatura	manager	with	 little	 independence	 in	govern-
ing	the	region.	The	two	main	tasks	that	the	Kremlin	expects	the	governors	to	
achieve	concern	subduing	conflicts	within	the	regional	elites	and	ensuring	so-
cial	peace.	Both	require	governors	to	enjoy	at	least	the	neutrality	of	the	most	
important	regional	interest	group	leaders.
In	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 system	of	 power,	Alikhanov	has	 succeeded	personally	 in	
smoothly	navigating	his	own	election	as	the	oblast	governor,	ensuring	Vladimir	
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
18
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 1
0/
20
19
Putin’s	good	result	in	the	presidential	elections	in	March	2018	in	the	region,	
and	the	smooth	organisation	of	the	World	Cup	in	June	and	July	2018	(including	
the	timely	completion	of	the	sports	facilities	that	were	at	risk	of	falling	behind	
schedule).	Furthermore,	his	failure	to	tackle	the	challenges	of	social	policy	and	
attract	investors	to	the	region	is	attributable	not	so	much	to	the	regional	fac-
tor	as	to	decisions	taken	at	the	federal	level,	including	Russia’s	attachment	to	
an	ineffective	economic	model,	a	bad	investment	climate,	a	seriously	underfi-
nanced	and	inefficient	social	policy,	and	Moscow’s	aggressive	foreign	policy	for	
which	Russia	has	been	punished	with	Western	economic	sanctions.	
Presidential elections in March 2018
Vladimir Putin’s official result in the Kaliningrad Oblast was almost identi-
cal to the Russian average (76.35% compared to 76.69% across the country) 
and much better than in 2012 when he won only 52.55% of the vote in the 
oblast (the second-worst result after Moscow where he won 47.72% of the 
vote) against the significantly higher national average (63.6%). The turn-
out in 2018 was slightly lower in the Kaliningrad Oblast than in the whole 
country (62.3% vs. 67.54%).2 
Experts	believe	that	Alikhanov’s	position	is	strong,	compared	to	the	other	re-
gional	chiefs	in	Russia.	This	is	also	reflected	in	the	rankings	compiled	by	vari-
ous	institutions	with	more	or	less	close	links	to	the	Kremlin.	It	is	worth	noting	
here	that	the	rankings	do	not	so	much	reflect	any	objective	factors	determin-
ing	the	robustness	of	a	given	governor’s	position,	but	rather	the	current	bal-
ance	of	power	in	the	ruling	elite	and	the	extent	to	which	the	given	governor	is	
useful	for	the	Kremlin	in	the	pursuit	of	its	current	objectives.
Alikhanov in governor rankings
In the Governors’ Influence Ranking, prepared in January 2019 by the 
Kremlin-based Political and Economic Communication Agency APEK, 
Alikhanov ranked 15th among the 85 governors. According to the Minchen-
ko Consulting expert group’s ranking announced in September 2018, al-
though Alikhanov’s position has weakened, he still ranks high (second) 
in the ranking of the regional heads of the Northwestern Federal District  
2	 ‘После	обработки	всех	протоколов	в	Калининградской	области	Путин	получил	76,35%	
голосов’,	Калининград.Ru,	19.03.2018;	‘Карта	голосования:	явка	и	результат	Путина	по	
регионам	России’,	Ведомости,	18.03.2018.
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(10th in the Russia-wide ranking), gaining seven out of ten points in the “Pu-
tin’s support” category, four out of five points in the “major project man-
agement” category and two out of three points in the “quality of political 
management” category. The ranking points out that there is a growing in-
tra-regional conflict, which may indicate that the regional elite is becom-
ing increasingly dissatisfied with Alikhanov. According to the Medialogia 
agency, which monitors and analyses media and social networks, in 2018 
Alikhanov’s position significantly deteriorated in comparison to other gov-
ernors (from 13th to 23rd position) and he did not make it to the top-20 re-
gional heads most frequently mentioned in social networks. This is partly 
because he has been less active in the media than in 2017, the year of the 
gubernatorial elections in the Kaliningrad Oblast.3
It is unclear whether and to what extent corruption practices in the re-
gion have decreased due to Alikhanov’s actions –	no	specific	information	on	
this	subject	has	yet	emerged,	although	several	anti-corruption	investigations	
are	underway	in	the	region.	One	of	them	concerns	embezzlement	surround-
ing	the	construction	of	the	stadium	in	Kaliningrad	and	a	former	construction	
minister	in	the	government	of	former	governor	Nikolai	Tsukanov	has	been	ar-
rested	as	part	of	it.4	Formally,	the	regional	administration	is	fighting	corrup-
tion.	For	example,	in	December	2018,	as	part	of	the	implementation	of	Vladimir	
Putin’s	national	guidelines,	Alikhanov	established	an	anti-corruption	service	
(tasked	with	‘preventive’	activities).	On	30th	May	2018,	at	the	request	of	Alikh-
anov,	Kaliningrad	City	Council	adopted	an	amendment	to	its	statute	allowing	
the	governor	to	initiate	the	dismissal	of	councillors	who	violate	anti-corrup-
tion	laws.	However,	there	are	many	indications	that pre-existing corruption 
schemes are merely being centralised and taken over by newly appointed 
persons linked to Moscow,	including	representatives	of	the	Alikhanov	team,	
and	that	local	elites	have	been	deprived	of	part	of	their	proceeds	from	corrup-
tion.	This	applies,	among	other	things,	to	the	municipal	water	supply	company	
Vodokanal	 in	Kaliningrad,	previously	under	the	control	of	Mayor	Yaroshuk.	
The	former	director	of	 the	company,	Alexander	 Ivashchenko,	was	dismissed	
3	 ‘Рейтинг	влияния	глав	субъектов	РФ.	Российские	регионы	и	региональная	политика	
в	декабре	2018	года’,	APEK,	9.01.2019;	‘Алиханов	теряет	лидерские	позиции	в	рейтинге	
устойчивости	глав	регионов’,	RuGrad.EU,	30.09.2018;	‘В	2018	году	Алиханов	потерял	
13	позиций	в	медиарейтинге	губернаторов’,	Новый Калининград,	29.01.2019.
4	 Two	businessmen,	the	Magomedov	brothers,	were	arrested	in	2018	in	connection	with	this	
investigation,	among	others	(the	case	then	took	on	a	federal	dimension).	For	more	informa-
tion	see:	I.	Wiśniewska,	‘The	Magomedov	brothers	under	arrest:	growing	rivalry	inside	the	
Russian	elite’	[series:	“OSW	Analyses”],	11.04.2018.	
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in	November	2018.	He	has	been	accused	of	embezzlement	and	an	arrest	war-
rant	has	been	issued	for	him.	There	are	plans	to	centralise	water	management	
in	the	whole	region	by	transferring	the	ownership	of	the	existing	companies	
from	the	municipal	authorities	 to	 the	regional	authorities.	 In	 June	2018,	 the	
regional	parliament	adopted	a	law	on	the	matter.
According	to	independent	media	reports,	during	Alikhanov’s	term	of	office	the 
transparency of the decision-making process has been gradually erod-
ing.	 Meetings	 of	 the	 regional	 government,	 including	 meetings	 with	 repre-
sentatives	of	municipal	authorities,	are	increasingly	often	closed	to	the	media,	
as	are	Alikhanov’s	meetings	with	business	representatives.	Against	this	back-
ground,	it	is	worth	noting	that	the	governmental	Corporation	for	the	Develop-
ment	of	the	Kaliningrad	Region	has	acquired,	without	a	public	offering,	a	26%	
stake	in	the	private	regional	radio	and	television	station	Kaskad.	According	to	
some	commentators,	the	intention	of	the	regional	authorities	is	to	create	a	gov-
ernmental	media	holding	company.5
2. Political opposition and repression
The political opposition in the region is weak and divided, just as it is in 
Russia generally.	Representative government structures are dominated by 
the ‘party of power’, United Russia (UR).	In	the	2016	elections	to	the	regional	
parliament	and	city	council	of	Kaliningrad,	UR	won	29	seats	out	of	40	in	the	re-
gional	parliament	and	20	seats	out	of	28	in	the	city	council.	The	parties	of	the	
so-called	licensed	opposition	and	two	deputies	from	the	Patriots	of	Russia	party	
(which	is	a	de facto	pro-Kremlin	formation)	also	entered	the	regional	parliament.
The activities of the ‘licensed’ parliamentary opposition, such	 as	 Gen-
nady	 Zyuganov’s	 Communist	 Party	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 or	 Vladimir	
Zhirinovsky’s	Liberal	Democratic	Party	of	Russia,	serve the interests of the 
government. The fragile anti-system opposition is	centred	around	the	staff	
of	Alexei	Navalny,	the	Open	Russia	movement	of	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky,	and	
parties	not	represented	in	the	parliament,	such	as	Yabloko	and	Parnas.	How-
ever,	none	of	them	plays	a	significant	role	and	they	regularly	face	repression	
(especially	activists	from	Navalny’s	team	and	Open	Russia).	The	weakness	of	
the	opposition	does	not	stop	the	secret	services	from	escalating	their	narrative	
5	 ‘Расширение	«закрытой	части»:	как	правительство	Алиханова	прячет	свою	работу’,	
Новый Калининград,	30.01.2019;	 ‘Алиханов	отказался	объяснять	покупку	доли	
в	телеканале	«Каскад»’,	RuGrad.EU,	10.02.2019.
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about	a	threat	to	the	stability	and	security	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	posed	by	
foreign	 agents	 and	a	 local	 ‘fifth	 column’	 –	 in	 line	with	 the	political	 strategy	
adopted	at	the	federal	level.
Despite the region’s specific geopolitical situation and the special ser-
vices’ ‘besieged fortress’ narrative, the level of repression in the Kalinin-
grad Oblast does not differ from the Russian average.	As	in	most	regions,	
the	authorities	try	to	find	the	right	balance	between	using	repression	for	‘pre-
ventive’	purposes	(excessive	‘liberalism’	in	this	regard	would	be	seen	as	a	sign	
of	the	inability	of	both	the	secret	services	and	the	civilian	authorities	to	control	
the	situation	 in	 the	region)	and	 in	order	 to	reduce	 the	scale	of	repression	to	
what	is	deemed	necessary	–	for	image	reasons	and	for	fear	of	an	uncontrolled	
increase	in	social	discontent	in	the	region.	This	is	probably	explained	by	the	
fact	that	the authorities prefer to be cautious: they do not wish to exces-
sively antagonise the local population,	which	has	proven	 itself	 capable	of	
mass	protest	in	the	past.	Repression is thus applied selectively,	although	in	
many	cases	it	is	painful.	It	mainly	targets	active	supporters	of	Alexei	Navalny	
and	activists	of	Mikhail	Khodorkovsky’s	Open	Russia	(OR).	This	is	usually	in	
connection	with	their	activities	driven	by	the	general	dynamics	of	social	pro-
tests	in	Russia.	The	detentions	and	administrative	penalties	for	coordinators	
of	Navalny’s	staff	in	October	2018	in	connection	with	environmental	protests	
or	pension	reform	protests	may	serve	as	an	example	of	this.	In	addition,	in	De-
cember	2017	and	on	other	occasions,	OR	activists	have	been	held	administra-
tively	liable	for	working	with	an	“undesirable	organisation”.
In	April	2018,	the	independent	newspaper	Novye kolyosa	suspended	the	publica-
tion	of	its	paper	version	due	to	significant	difficulties	in	distribution.	Its	editor-
in-chief	Igor	Rudnikov	was	kept	in	custody	since	November	2017	until	June	2019	
on	charges	of	attempting	to	force	a	bribe	from	the	regional	head	of	the	Investi-
gation	Committee.	The	case	was	unclear	because,	apart	from	the	fact	that	Rud-
nikov	may	have	disturbed	the	authorities	with	his	journalistic	and	investigative	
activities,	it	is	possible	that	he	may	have	been	a	victim	of,	or	used	as	a	tool	in,	
rivalry	between	the	local	services.	This	may	indirectly	be	confirmed	by	the	fact	
that	the	Rudnikov	trial	was	not	only	taking	place	outside	the	Kaliningrad	region	
(in	St.	Petersburg),	but	was	also	classified	as	secret.	In	June	2019	Rudnikov	was	
acquitted	and	released	–	the	move	was	most	probably	motivated	by	the	angry	
social	reaction	to	the	repression	against	another	journalist,	Ivan	Golunov.6
6	 See:	J.	Rogoża,	‘Rosja:	sprawa	Gołunowa	i	sukces	presji	społecznej’	[series:	“OSW	Analyses”],	
12.06.2019.	
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The	most	famous	case	of	political	repression	in	recent	years	has	been	the	crim-
inal case brought against the fringe nationalist-monarchist organisation 
BARS (Baltic Vanguard of the Russian Resistance).	In	recent	years,	the	or-
ganisation	has	vexed	the	authorities,	including	in	connection	with	its	criticism	
of	the	war	launched	by	Russia	in	Ukraine.	However,	it	in	no	way	posed	a	politi-
cal	threat	because	of	 its	 insignificant	clout	and	low	recognisability.	 Its	three	
activists,	arrested	in	May	2017,	were	initially	accused	of	extremism	(a	crime	
is	punishable	by	up	to	ten	years’	imprisonment),	including	efforts	to	forcefully	
seize	power	in	the	Kaliningrad	region	and	wrest	the	oblast	away	from	Russia	
for	it	to	join	the	EU.	In	October	2018,	the	prosecution	changed	the	classification	
of	the	alleged	acts	to	terrorism	(organisation	of	a	terrorist	group),	punishable	
by	life	imprisonment	for	the	leader	of	the	group,	Alexander	Orshulevich.	The	
case	will	be	heard	by	a	military	court	in	Moscow.	The	human	rights	organisa-
tion	Memorial	considers	the	detainees	to	be	political	prisoners.
The	BARS	case	is	part	of	the secret services’ and law enforcement agencies’ 
fight against alleged extremism,	which	has	been	noticeably	stepped	up	 in	
recent	years	(but	which	generally	serves	mainly	to	boost	crime	detection	sta-
tistics	and	stifle	freedom	of	speech).	This	case	has	also	been	used	in	the	‘anti-
Germanisation’	 campaign	 (the	 BARS	 leader	 called	 for	 the	 restoration	 of	 the	
name	Königsberg	to	Kaliningrad)	and	served	as	a	pretext	for	the	attack	on	the	
German-Russian	House	in	Kaliningrad	(see	below),	as	well	as	for	broader	re-
pressions	against	activists	of	the	Kaliningrad	staff	of	Alexei	Navalny	and	Open	
Russia.	Among	other	instances,	in	August	2017,	a	search	was	carried	out	on	OR	
activists	(and	Navalny’s	team	members)	as	Open	Russia	was	accused	of	financ-
ing	BARS	as	its	militant	wing.
In February 2019 Kaliningrad saw Russia’s first administrative case ini-
tiated under the law on punishment for the participation of minors in 
unsanctioned protest actions (the	 law	was	adopted	 in	December	2018;	 the	
unsanctioned	action	in	this	case	was	a	protest	on	7	February	against	the	use	
of	torture	against	Alexander	Orshulevich).	The	organiser	of	the	protest,	Ivan	
Luzin	(an	activist	of	Navalny’s	staff)	was	fined	30,000	roubles	(ca.	US$	460).	
3. Public sentiments and social activity
Social	moods	in	the	region	are	to	a	large	extent	conditioned	by	the	social	and	
economic	situation	and	problems	occurring	 in	this	sphere. The standard of 
living in the region is below the Russian average.	Residents	are	dissatisfied	
with	the	increase	in	prices	and	municipal	tariffs,	the	raising	of	the	retirement	
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age	and	environmental	problems.	However,	this	dissatisfaction	manifests	it-
self	mainly	in	online	discussions	and,	in	individual	cases,	in	open	letters	ad-
dressed	to	the	regional	authorities	by	groups	of	activists.7	It	translates	into	ac-
tive	street	protests	only	to	a	small	extent.	The	level	of	social	activity,	including	
protest	activity,	in	the	Kaliningrad	region	shows	a	negative	dynamic	compared	
to	the	previous	decade.	According	to	the	report	of	the	Institute	of	Regional	Ex-
pertise8	in	2019	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	ranks	23rd	among	the	Russian	regions	
in	terms	of	protest	activity;	it	has	been	classified	as	a	region	with	a	visible	(but	
not	‘high’)	level	of	activity.	The	protests	taking	place	are	often	co-organised	by	
the	regional	branches	of	political	parties	–	both	opposition	parties	and	parties	
closer	to	the	authorities	(except	for	United	Russia).
The raising of the retirement age in 2018 was the biggest factor in spurring 
social discontent in the Kaliningrad Oblast.	The	 issue	has	 led	 to	 consider-
able	social	resistance	throughout	Russia.	According	to	polls,	more	than	90%	of	
respondents	are	against	this	measure.	In	the	Kaliningrad	region	it	particularly	
affects	men	whose	average	 life	expectancy,	according	to	Rosstat’s	Kaliningrad	
branch,	is	67	years	(i.e.	only	two	years	above	the	new	retirement	age).	The	protest	
against	the	reform	in	July	2018	was	around	1,000-strong	in	Kaliningrad,	and	the	
demonstrators	chanted	not	only	social	 slogans	but	also	political	ones,	 such	as	
“Putin,	retire,	Medvedev,	resign”.9	Other	examples	of	protests	included	actions	
against	pollution	(including	landfill	sites),	fuel	price	rises,	and	the	arrest	of	a	lo-
cal	investigative	journalist	and	former	member	of	the	regional	parliament	Igor	
Rudnikov.	The	protests	usually	attracted	people	in	the	dozens.
The	attitude	towards	the	regional	leader,	Governor	Anton	Alikhanov,	a	politi-
cian	from	outside	the	region	who	represents	the	 interests	of	Moscow,	 is	one	
of	moderate	optimism	and	passive	acceptance.10	In	the	gubernatorial	elections	
7	 С.	Шерстюк,	‘Открытое	письмо	Губернатору	Калининградской	области	Алиханову	А.А.’,	
RuGrad.EU,	26.03.2018.
8	 Рейтинг	протестной	активности	российских	регионов,	Институт	региональной	
Экспертизы,	February	2019.
9	 Ю.	Парамонова,	‘На митинге оппозиции в Калининграде потребовали отправить Путина 
на пенсию’, RuGrad.EU,	31.07.2018.
10	 There	are	no	current	surveys	on	public	support	for	Alikhanov.	In	the	October	2016	survey	
conducted	after	his	nomination	was	announced,	54.3%	of	respondents	hoped	for	change	for	
the	better,	32.3%	said	they	did	not	expect	anything	good,	and	13%	had	no	opinion.	When	
asked	whether	the	appointment	of	the	young	governor	opened	up	new	prospects	for	the	
region,	43.5%	answered	in	the	affirmative,	36.7%	said	the	opposite.	See:	‘Опрос:	Более	
половины	жителей	Калининграда	ждут	лучшей	жизни	при	Алиханове’,	Кали	нин-
град.Ru,	12.10.2016.
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Alikhanov	won	81%	of	the	vote.	The governor is not supported by the region-
al intellectual elites,	who	accuse	him	of	misunderstanding	the	specificity	of	
the	region,	but the majority of the inhabitants seem to passively accept his 
policy.	This	contrasts	with	 the	active	expressions	of	discontent	 towards	 the	
previous	governor	from	outside	the	region,	Georgy	Boos.	Protests	against	him	
in	2010,	up	to	10,000-strong,	eventually	led	to	his	resignation.
Although	protest	activity	in	the	region	is	currently	relatively	low,	there are 
many grassroots social initiatives,	mostly	apolitical,	related	to	the	protec-
tion	of	the	cultural	heritage	of	the	region	or	charity	work.	There	are	many	so-
cial	groups	and	associations	such	as	“The	Right	to	the	City”,	bringing	together	
local	activists	dealing	with	various	aspects	of	urban	 life	–	ecological,	 social,	
municipal,	architectural,	etc.	They	campaign	for	the	revitalisation	of	neglected	
urban	spaces	with	historic	buildings	(fortifications,	etc.).11	Because	of	the	dif-
ficult	environmental	situation	of	the	region	–	water	contaminated	by	sewage,	
problems	caused	by	landfills	(activists	are	still	discovering	new	illegal	 land-
fills	despite	the	declaration	of	the	authorities	to	eliminate	all	of	them	in	2016),	
tree	felling	in	cities	–	environmental	organisations	are	active	in	Kaliningrad,	
including	Ekozashchita	or	regional	branches	of	the	Green	Front	organisation.	
They	organise	pickets,	blockades	of	 trees	 scheduled	 to	be	 felled,	 social	 cam-
paigns	to	clean	up	the	coastline,	etc.	Many	initiatives	are	created	and	devel-
oped	 on	 the	 Internet,	 in	 thematic	 groups	 such	 as	Musora.bolshe.net,	which	
conducts	educational	campaigns	on	waste	sorting,	or	the	Avenues	of	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast,	which	maintains	the	tradition	of	caring	for	old	trees	and	publi-
cises	felling	plans.
In	2018,	Kaliningrad	hosted	the	“City	of	Rights”	human	rights	festival	for	the	
first	time.	This	festival	brings	together	human	rights	activists,	urban	planning	
and	urban	ecosystem	activists,	charities,	and	people	interested	in	culture	and	
social	 art.	 Kaliningrad	 activists	 are	 inspired	 by	 the	 Polish	 social	 campaign	
“Living	Street”,	which	 involves	 the	 transformation	of	neglected	public	 spac-
es.	In	Kaliningrad	there	are	a	number	of	places	that	combine	the	functions	of	
public	spaces,	museums,	conference	rooms,	coworking	spaces	and	restaurants	
and	attract	activist	communities,	e.g.	the	art-space	“Gate”	located	within	the	
historical	walls	of	the	Sackheim	Gate,	which	further	underlines	the	interest	of	
activists	in	the	pre-war	roots	of	the	region.
11	 See:	А.	Колотыгина,	К.	Черёмушкина,	‘Вал	проблем:	Попытки	«оживить»	Литовский	
вал	и	их	результаты’,	Твой Бро.
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For	six	years	now,	the	Kafka	and	Orwell	Forum	–	an	independent	discussion	fo-
rum,	supported	by	local	business	and	the	Civil	Initiatives	Committee	of	former	
Deputy	Prime	Minister	Alexei	Kudrin	–	has	been	held	in	the	Kaliningrad	part	
of	the	Curonian	Spit.	Invitees	include	opposition	politicians,	experts,	column-
ists	and	poets	including	Lew	Shlosberg,	Yevgeny	Roizman	and	Andrey	Orlov.	
The	forum	has	been	the	subject	of	the	attention	of	the	regional	authorities	from	
the	beginning.	During	the	last	meeting	in	September	2018	the	OMON	special	
forces	carried	out	a	raid	in	the	hotel	where	the	participants	stayed,	accusing	
them	of	drug	trafficking.12	
The World Cup 2018, which	included	some	matches	held	in	Kaliningrad, was 
an opportunity to open the region up to the world and intensify people-
to-people contacts between the region’s inhabitants and foreign tourists.	
During	the	World	Cup,	the	region	was	visited	by	260,000	thousand	tourists,	
including	90,000	foreigners.13	The	plans	to	build	a	cultural	and	entertainment	
complex	in	Kaliningrad	on	the	island	of	Oktyabrsky,	where	the	new	stadium	
is	located,	may	attract	even	more	visitors	to	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	both	for-
eign	tourists	and	those	from	other	regions	of	Russia.	A	branch	of	the	Tretyakov	
Gallery,	an	opera	and	ballet	theatre,	and	universities	are	to	be	based	there	(the	
completion	of	the	complex	is	scheduled	for	2023).14
4. regional identity and the so-called Germanisation problem
The social and historical identity of the inhabitants of the Kaliningrad 
Oblast remains complex, but it includes a strong identification with the 
region and with Europe.	The	highest	result	(50%)	was	of	residents	who	iden-
tify	primarily	as	‘Kaliningrad	people’,	i.e.	inhabitants	of	Kaliningrad	and	the	
Kaliningrad	Oblast),	a	slightly	lower	percentage	identify	as	‘Russians,	citizens	
of	Russia’	(44%),	while	3%	identify	as	‘Europeans	(those	and	the	following	fig-
ures	 are	 based	 on	 a	KMG	poll	 in	October	 201815).	Those	who	 see	 themselves	
as	 ‘citizens	of	Russia’	are	more	likely	to	be	people	who	have	moved	to	Kalin-
ingrad	from	mainland	Russia	or	from	the	CIS	area	relatively	recently.	When	
12	 О.	Зурман,	В.	Невар, ‘Кафка,	Оруэлл	и	силовики:	что	произошло	после	форума	в	Светло-
горске’,	Новый Калининград,	18.09.2018.
13	 Ростуризм подвел туристические итоги Чемпионата мира по футболу FIFA 2018 в России,	
Federal	Tourism	Agency,	3.08.2018.
14	 ‘Путину	показали,	как	будет	выглядеть	культурный	комплекс	на	Острове	в	Калинин-
граде’,	Калининград.Ru,	8.01.2019.
15	 О Калининградцах – Опрос жителей города Калининграда (октябрь 2018),	Исследовательская	
компания	«КМГ»,	16.11.2018.
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describing	themselves,	the	inhabitants	of	Kaliningrad	most	often	selected	the	
following	descriptions:	‘people	with	a	European	mentality	and	lifestyle’	(22%),	
‘friendly,	open	and	hospitable	people’	(13%),	‘people	whose	lifestyle	is	different	
than	elsewhere	in	Russia’	(4%),	but	also	‘abandoned	people’	and	‘not	needed	by	
anyone’	(3%).
The people of Kaliningrad admit to being distinct from the rest of Rus-
sia –	96%	believe	that	their	region	is	different	from	other	Russian	regions.	In	
an	open	question	about	the	region’s	distinctive	characteristics,	50%	pointed	to	
amber	extraction,	50%	to	the	region’s	location	on	the	Baltic	Sea,	42%	to	neigh-
bourhood	of	the	European	Union,	34%	to	the	unique	history,	22%	to	the	separa-
tion	from	the	rest	of	Russia,	and	21%	to	the	unique	nature.	The	perceptions	of	
the positive and negative aspects of the region’s location were distributed 
evenly:	 15%	of	respondents	believe	 that	 the	oblast’s	 location	generates	more	
opportunities,	16%	think	it	generates	more	problems,	40%	think	there	are	as	
many	opportunities	as	problems,	and	23%	say	it	does	not	affect	their	lives	in	
any	way.
References to the region’s pre-war history may not be dominant in the re-
gional identity but they form an important part of it.	When	describing	the	
region’s	capital	city,	the	inhabitants	chose	phrases	such	as	‘a	city	with	a	histo-
ry’	(11%)	or	‘little	Europe’	(9%),	and	some	even	said	‘Russian	Europe’	or	‘Russian	
Germany’.	Most	 respondents	 (53%)	 unequivocally	 considered	 the	 Protestant	
cathedral	where	Immanuel	Kant	 is	buried	to	be	the	most	 important	historic	
monument	of	Kaliningrad.	The residents of Kaliningrad did not share the 
concerns, sometimes raised by the government, about the increased cul-
tural influence of Germany	or	attempts	at	imposing	German	culture	and	tra-
dition	on	them.	The	phenomenon	was	observed,	in	varying	degrees,	by	9%	of	
respondents,	while	86%	said	they	did	not	experience	it.	The	percentage	of	the	
region’s	residents	who	are	in	favour	of	restoring	Kaliningrad’s	pre-war	name	
of	Königsberg	 is	 also	 small,	 but	not	marginal	 at	 12%,	while	81%	of	 residents	
are	in	favour	of	maintaining	the	current	name.	Thus,	there	is	rather	a	kind	of	
snobbery	about	‘Germanness’,	which	is	treated	not	so	much	as	an	identity	point	
of	reference,	but	rather	as	a	kind	of	folklore,	as	well	as	a	synonym	for	quality	
and	a	tourist	brand.
This persistent sense the oblast’s residents have of being distinct has been 
influencing Moscow’s perception of the political and economic situation 
in the Kaliningrad Oblast. Because of its geopolitical importance, the re-
gion has been the object of specific ideological and propaganda efforts, 
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including in the field of historical policy. There is no unanimity among 
the decision-makers involved on the detailed content of this policy. 
The alleged ‘Germanisation’ and the need to counter it (i.e.	the	memory	of	
the	German	heritage	 in	every	dimension) are permanent topics in the re-
gional public debate about identity and history,	artificially	stoked	by	the	
‘patriotic	 communities’	 gathered	 around	 several	 pro-Kremlin	media	 outlets	
with	limited	reach	in	the	region	(including	the	Regnum	agency),	and	promoted	
and	exploited	by	the	army	and	the	special	services.	At the official level there 
is a clear tendency to obliterate or ignore the German heritage	(perhaps	
with	the	exception	of	Immanuel	Kant	and	his	legacy),	despite	the	pretence	of	
actions	aimed	at	e.g.	protecting	German	architecture.	
Before 2016, there was relatively little discussion about ‘Germanisation’ 
and	most	of	it	was	connected	with	the	repeated	initiatives	to	rename	Kalinin-
grad	as	Königsberg,	while	the	criticism	was	limited	to	several	 ‘patriotic’	me-
dia	outlets.	The anti-Germanisers became much more active in the spring 
of 2016,	when	Nikolai Dolgachov	became	the	chief	of	the	regional	branch	of	
the	All-Russian	 State	 Television	 and	Radio	 Broadcasting	 Company	 (VGTRK,	
the	 largest	state-owned	media	holding).	Together	with	Andrey Vypolzov of	
the	Regnum	agency,	Dolgachov	unleashed	a	defamation	campaign	against	the	
alleged	 ‘Germanisers’	 (the	 ‘fifth	 column’).	 Among	 those	 targeted	 by	 the	 ac-
tion	were:	the	Kaliningrad-based	cultural	institution	German-Russian	House	
(GRH)	 (the	only	one	of	 its	kind	 in	Russia	 that	was	not	 subject	 to	 the	official	
structures	of	the	German	minority	in	the	Russian	Federation),	and	representa-
tives	of	the	intelligentsia	and	the	opposition	calling	for	the	protection	of	Ger-
man	historic	monuments	in	the	region.
The	regional	branch	of	the	VGTRK	broadcast	a	number	of	anti-German	and	anti-
opposition	programmes.	In	August	2018,	it	broadcast	a	programme	discrediting	
the	 non-governmental	 organisation	 Zelenogradsk-Pinneberg	which	 had	 been	
working	with	German	partners	within	the	framework	of	a	partnership	between	
the	two	cities	of	the	organisation’s	name	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s.	The	
youth	exchange	trips	to	Germany	that	it	organised	were	presented	as	recruit-
ment	activities	for	the	German	special	services.	After	attempts	were	made	to	as-
sign	the	organisation	the	status	of	a	‘foreign	agent’	it	dissolved	its	official	struc-
tures	in	March	2016,	although	it	continues	to	work	on	an	informal	basis.	
There are many indications that the intensification of the “anti-Ger-
manisation” media campaign was a personal initiative of Dolgachov and 
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Vypolzov but which was however supported by the secret services and 
was in line with their strategy in the Kaliningrad Oblast and the politi-
cal interests of the Kremlin.	Already	in	March	2016,	i.e.	before	Dolgachov’s	
arrival	in	Kaliningrad,	a	branch	of	the	Academy	of	Geopolitical	Problems	(af-
filiated	with	the	Ministry	of	Defence)	was	opened	in	this	city,	promoting	the	
narrative	of	a	 “powerful	 information	war	 in	 the	region”,	 in	which	Germany	
was	allegedly	carrying	out	activities	to	eradicate	Russian	identity.	In	the	fight	
against	“Germanisation”	the	BARS	case	was	used	instrumentally.	One	of	the	
things	 which	 this	 led	 to	 was	 the	 final	 crackdown	 on	 the	 German-Russian	
House	 (GRH),	 closed	 in	2017	 (there	are	many	 indications	 that	BARS	allowed	
itself	to	be	used	as	a	tool	in	a	provocation	against	the	management	of	the	GRH).	
The	case	of	 the	GRH	 is	a	 clear	 indication	of	the real objectives of the Rus-
sian authorities and services. They aim not only at ‘protecting Russian 
identity’ against the attempts of ‘Germanisers’ – they also seek to appro-
priate the concept of ‘Germanness’ in order to further Russian political, 
economic and secret service interests.	Shortly	after	the	closure	of	the	GRH	
in	October	2017,	it	was	reopened	as	an	entity	subordinated	to	the	official	struc-
tures	 of	 the	 Federal	 National	 and	 Cultural	 Autonomy	 of	 Russian	 Germans,	
led	by	Genrikh	Martens,	who	in	the	past	was	active	(as	a	trustee)	in	Vladimir	
Putin’s	election	campaigns.	Martens	has	openly	spoken	out	against	the	“Ger-
manisation”	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	pointing	to	the	“Russianness”	of	eth-
nic	Germans	living	in	Russia.	The	mission	of	the	new	GRH	has	been	extended.	
Apart	from	cultural	activities	it	is	now	tasked	with	promoting	economic	and	
business	contacts	between	Russian	and	German	entrepreneurs.
Occasionally, the ‘opponents of Germanisation’ commit acts of hooligan-
ism in the Kaliningrad Oblast. One	example	of	this	was	in	November	2018	
when	the	Kant	monument	in	Kaliningrad,	his	tombstone	and	memorial	plaque	
were	defaced	(covered	with	paint).	Leaflets	were	scattered	around,	calling	Kant	
a	traitor,	an	enemy	and	a	German.	Provocations	targeting	Russian	memorial	
sites	have	also	 taken	place	whereby	the	supposed	 ‘Germanisers’	placed	Nazi	
symbols	or	calls	to	overthrow	the	Russian	government	on	defaced	monuments.	
The aggressive ‘anti-Germanisation’ efforts, consistent with the Kremlin-
promoted image of Russia as a ‘besieged fortress’, do not necessarily fit 
in with the interests of the regional authorities	who	care	about	good	rela-
tions	with	Germany	and	strive	to	improve	the	investment	climate	in	the	region	
and	strengthen	its	image	as	an	attractive	tourist	destination.	The	anti-German	
media	campaign	has	also	been	criticised	by	the	regional	representation	of	the	
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Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	of	the	Russian	Federation,16	which	has	been	actively	
lobbying	for	Russian	geopolitical	and	business	interests	in	Germany.	The offi-
cial positions of the Kaliningrad authorities,	including	Alikhanov	and	Tsu-
kanov	before	him, prove they wish to distance themselves from this kind 
of propaganda campaign (Alikhanov	 said	 in	2016	 that	 the	 issue	of	 the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast’s	Germanisation	was	‘made	up’),	although	they	have	not	been	
actively	 countering	 this	 kind	 of	 initiative.	The position of the authorities 
on the demands for better protection of Kaliningrad’s post-German his-
torical heritage is also ambiguous. Most likely it is influenced by specific 
business interest of groups with links to the region’s authorities. Gover-
nor	Alikhanov	has	stopped	all	speculation	about	the	possibility	of	rebuilding	
the	medieval	Royal	Castle	 in	Kaliningrad,	opting	 instead	 for	 the	completion	
of	the	long	decaying	House	of	Soviets,	built	on	the	ruins	of	the	castle	in	Soviet	
times.	However,	he	has	declared	(already	in	November	2016)	his	willingness	
to	rebuild	the	old	German	railway	stations	(so	far	the	station	in	Pionersky	has	
been	renovated),	and	in	February	2018	an	action	plan	to	compile	an	inventory	
of	historical	heritage	sites	was	announced.	A	debate	is	also	going	on	(mainly	
at	the	civil	society	level)	on	the	future	of	German	post-industrial	buildings	in	
which	 supporters	of	 a	demolition	 that	would	 free	up	attractive	plots	 for	de-
velopment	clash	with	advocates	of	renovating	these	zones	and	incorporating	
them	into	the	tourist	and	recreational	urban	space.
16	 ‘Региональное	представительство	МИД	РФ	опубликовало	заявление	в	защиту	немец-
ких	НКО’,	RuGrad.EU,	2.06.2016.
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II. ecONOMIc SITuATION ANd POlIcy IN The 
KAlININGrAd OblAST
1. Social and economic situation
The	economic	situation	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	closely	dependent	on	the	
development	of	the	situation	in	the	whole	of	Russia.	After the collapse of 2015, 
the oblast’s economy has been growing for the last three years, and the 
region’s growth rate as well as most of the macroeconomic indicators 
have been much better than the Russian average.17	Several	factors	contrib-
uted	to	this,	 including	in	particular	the	influx	of	federal	funds	to	the	region	
(significant	compared	the	oblast’s	size)	for	infrastructure	projects,	including	
the	construction	of	a	floating	LNG	terminal	on	the	Baltic	coast,	the	expansion	
of	 the	energy	 infrastructure,	 the	construction	of	a	 football	 stadium	and	the	
expansion	of	an	airport	which	was	necessary	for	the	organisation	of	the	2018	
FIFA	World	Cup	matches.	However,	it	should	be	noted	that	some	of	the	federal	
investments,	which	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	region’s	economy	during	their	
implementation	(by	providing	employment	and	contracts	for	local	companies),	
in	the	long	run	will	not	become	a	driver	of	revenue	growth	for	the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast.	They	may	even	turn	out	to	be	a	burden	for	the	region.	In	the	case	of	the	
LNG	terminal,	the	investment	has	increased	the	energy	security	of	the	Kalin-
ingrad	Oblast,	but	it	is	doubtful	whether	the	terminal	will	be	used.	If	it	is,	the	
gas	supply	via	this	route	will	generate	significant	costs	for	Gazprom	(for	more	
information	see	Chapter	II.2.2)	and	the	federal	budget.	The	situation	with	the	
football	stadium,	whose	costs	of	70	million	a	year	will	be	shouldered	by	the	re-
gional	budget	as	of	2022,	may	prove	much	more	difficult	from	the	perspective	
of	regional	finances.	
It	 should	be	noted	 that	 the	 federal	authorities	are	 trying	 to	maintain	a	high	
level	of	federal	funding	flowing	into	to	the	region,	which	is	likely	to	have	a	pos-
itive	impact	on	the	regional	economy	in	the	years	to	come.	There	are	plans	to	
build	a	cultural	centre	in	Kaliningrad,	which	will	cost	twice	as	much	as	the	
football	stadium,	and	the	road	network	 in	 the	region	and	regional	ports	are	
being	expanded	and	modernised.	
17	 Macroeconomic	indicators	are	quoted	from	Rosstat	(the	statistical	office	of	the	Russian	Fed-
eration),	and	Rosstat,	Kaliningrad	office.	
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chart 1. Gross regional product of Kaliningrad Oblast and industrial output, 
agricultural output and construction
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Source: Rosstat
In	addition,	the	availability	of	bank	loans	has	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	eco-
nomic	situation	of	the	region	in	the	last	two	years,	reflecting	the	attractiveness	
of	interest	rates	due	to	low	inflation	and	lenient	bank	lending	requirements.	
In	a	situation	of	falling	real	incomes,	Kaliningrad	residents	maintained	con-
sumer	demand	by	taking	out	bank	loans	(in	2018	the	volume	of	private	debt	
in	the	region	increased	by	about	25%,	see	Chart	2),	which	contributed	in	par-
ticular	 to	 the	 increase	 in	sales	on	the	automotive	and	mortgage	markets.	As	
a	result,	the	Avtotor	plant	located	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	–	one	of	the	larg-
est	 car	manufacturers	 in	Russia	and	 the	 largest	manufacturing	company	 in	
the	region	(accounting	for	around 50%	of	the	oblast’s	manufacturing	industry)	
–	has	recorded	a	dynamic	increase	in	production	in	the	last	two	years	(more	
than	50%	in	2017	and	around	40%	in	2018,	with	sales	increasing	by	12%	and	
13%,	respectively,	in	those	years).	Avtotor’s	results	have	improved	also	due	to	
the	state	financial	support	the	company	has	been	receiving	from	the	federal	
budget	since	2016	as	compensation	for	the	abolition	of	the	customs	privileges	it	
benefited	from	before	the	changes	in	the	functioning	of	the	Kaliningrad	Spe-
cial	Economic	Zone	(see	below).	However,	maintaining	domestic	demand	at	its	
current	level	due	to	loans	will	be	very	difficult.	On	the	one	hand,	rising	infla-
tion	has	been	associated	with	rising	loan	interest	rate	prices,	and	on	the	other,	
the	central	bank,	concerned	about	the	excessive	indebtedness	of	the	popula-
tion,	has	taken	steps	leading	to	a	tightening	of	banks’	credit	policies.
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Chart 2. Personal debt levels in the Kaliningrad Oblast (in billions of roubles, 
as of first day of year and annual change in %) 
[% y/y][RUB billion]
1.01.2016 1.01.2017 1.01.2018 1.01.2019
-25
0
25
50
75
100
125
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
67.4 68.7
79.9
101.0
-3
2
16
25
Source: Central Bank of Russia
In	2018,	agricultural production in the Kaliningrad Oblast increased as 
well (by 9%).	Several	factors	contributed	to	the	growth	of	companies	in	this	
sector,	in	particular	protection	against	foreign	competition	(provided	by	pro-
tectionist	state	policy	and	counter-sanctions),	preferential	bank	loans	(below	
the	rate	of	inflation),	and,	above	all,	extensive	preferences	available	within	the	
Special	Economic	Zone.
Inflation	in	the	region	in	2018	grew	at	a	higher	rate	(4.8%)	than	the	average	
for	Russia	(4.3%),	with	prices	of	industrial	goods	increasing	by	5.3%,	and	food	
prices	by	4.6%.	The	increase	in	the	prices	of	some	goods,	especially	foods,	was	
much	higher	than	the	general	inflation	rate.	For	example,	the	price	of	eggs	in	
the	oblast	rose	by	over	35%	in	2018,	and	the	price	of	petrol	increased	by	almost	
10%	(despite	state	intervention).
Despite	positive	macroeconomic	trends,	the	standard of living in the Kalin-
ingrad Oblast remains below the Russian average	–	the	region	ranks	44th	
in	the	socio-economic	ranking	of	Russian	regions	(out	of	85	regions).	The	gross	
regional	product	per capita	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	about	80%	of	the	Rus-
sian	average.	People’s	standard	of	living	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	like	in	the	
other	regions,	has	not	improved	after	the	slump	in	2014–2016.	Although	real	
wages	have	been	rising	in	the	region	since	2017	and	increased	by	4%	in	2018,	
real	incomes	have	been	constantly	declining	for	five	years.	Unemployment	in	
the	region	has	been	steadily	falling	and	in	2018	stood	at	4.7%,	which	places	Ka-
liningrad	in	32nd	position	among	all	regions	of	Russia.
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has exceeded one million. However, the reason was not so much natural de-
mographic growth as a positive migration balance. Rosstat  show that 
on 1 January 2019, 1,002,271 people lived in the Oblast – that is 7,672 more than 
the year before. Although the birth rate was negative (10,316 people were born 
and 12,111 died), this was compensated for by a positive migration balance: 47,266 
people came to the region and 37,799 people l  e majority of the immigrants 
came from other regions of the Russian Federation, while the main foreign coun-
tries of origin included Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.18 
Chart 3. Real incomes in the Kaliningrad Oblast
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2013 2017
Average real wages as % of previous year
Average salary in RUB thousands
Real incomes as % of previous year
2016 20182014 2015
-50
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
-10
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
-1.5
9.0
-2.6
-2.9
0.4
4.1
-9.2
3.7
-2.5
-7.5
-1.0-1.0
25.10 26.60 28.30
29.50 30.6 32.6
Source:  Rosstat
18 Официальная статистика – Население, Калининградстат.
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2. The Kaliningrad Oblast in the economic policy of Moscow
In the last few years Moscow’s policy towards Kaliningrad Oblast has be-
come increasingly coherent and consistent. The Kremlin is visibly inter-
ested in the region and shows the political will to engage with it, which 
has resulted in an increase in federal spending in the region. 
On	 the	 one	 hand,	Moscow’s	 growing	 interest	 in	 the	 Kaliningrad	 region	 is	
an	element	of	the	Kremlin’s	regional	policy	being	implemented	throughout	
the	country,	which	aims	to	increase	the	centre’s	control,	including	economic	
control,	 over	 the	 regions,	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 tightening	 the	 system	of	
public	finances	by	reducing	corruption-generating	mechanisms	and	increas-
ing	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 public	 spending.	 However,	 due	 to	 Western	 sanc-
tions	 and	 limited	 opportunities	 to	 earn	 income	 abroad,	 public	 investment	
has	become	a	source	of	financing	and	a	way	to	expand	personal	wealth	for	
many	oligarchs	in	President	Putin’s	inner	circle	in	recent	years.	As	a	result	
of	Moscow’s	policy,	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	has	 seen	 the	 growing	presence	
and	importance	of	federal-level	corporations	such	as	the	state-owned	corpo-
ration	Rostec,	Gazprom,	Russian	Railways	and	companies	controlled	by	Pu-
tin’s	friends	Arkady	Rotenberg	(Stroygazmontazh)	and	Gennady	Timchenko	
(Stroytransgaz).
It is a permanent feature of the Kremlin’s policy towards the Kaliningrad 
Oblast that it strives to find a balance between, on the one hand, isolating 
the region from its European and NATO neighbours and using it as a for-
eign policy instrument, and on the other, taking advantage of its special 
location to derive economic benefits for the region and Russia from coop-
eration with its neighbours. 
The	growing	activity	of	the	Kremlin	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	Moscow’s	
efficacy	in	pursuing	its	main	policy	objectives	have	manifested	themselves	in	
the	last	few	years	in	the	implementation	of	several	major	investment	projects,	
including	the	development	of	the	region’s	electricity	and	transport	infrastruc-
tures	and	the	organisation	of	matches	of	the	2018	FIFA	World	Cup,	as	well	as	in	
the	new	rules	for	the	special	economic	zone	and	the	creation	of	a	‘tax	haven’	for	
foreign-registered	companies	moving	their	operations	to	the	region.	
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The	most	important	measures	taken	by	Moscow	with	regards	to	the	region	in-
cluded:
2.1. New rules for the functioning of the Special Economic Zone
Due	to	its	unique	geographical	location,	since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s	the	
region	has	been	operating	on	special	economic	principles	aimed	at	overcom-
ing	barriers	hindering	its	economic	development,	related	to	transport	prob-
lems,	a	small	internal	market	and	the	dependence	on	imports.	The	rules	for	
the	 functioning	of	 the	Special Economic Zone (SEZ),	 laid	down	 in	 federal	
laws,19	have	been	change	on	several	occasions	during	the	last	twenty	years.	
The	changes	introduced	since	2006	have	been	aimed,	on	the	one	hand,	at	re-
ducing	the	losses	incurred	by	the	Russian	budget	as	a	result	of	customs	ex-
emptions	for	entities	registered	in	the	zone	(initially,	several	thousand	busi-
nesses	were	eligible).	On	the	other	hand,	they	have	been	a	way	of	limiting	the	
number	of	entities	to	which	exemptions	were	granted,	and	thus	centralising	
the	regional	economy	by	promoting	 large,	mostly	federal,	enterprises.	This	
was	the	purpose	behind	the	introduction,	in	2006,	of	a	high	minimum	invest-
ment	threshold	of	RUB	150	million	for	residents	(around	US$	5	billion	based	
on	2006	exchange	rates).	However,	as	 the	Kremlin	gradually	abolished	the	
customs	duty	reductions	 for	Kaliningrad	residents	 in	a	process	which	was	
eventually	completed	 in	2016,	 the	 federal	authorities	 tried	to	prevent	a	de-
cline	of	the	local	economy	and	made	the	SEZ	more	attractive	also	to	smaller	
investors.	In	particular,	since	2016	the	federal	budget	has	provided	the	region	
with	special	funds:	in	2018	it	was	55	billion	roubles	(approximately	US$	0.8	
billion)	to	compensate	businesses	for	the	abolition	of	 tariffs	privileges.	The	
compensation	measures	resulted	in	a	significant	increase	in	the	level	of	fed-
eral	financial	support	for	the	region	and	thus	its	financial	dependence	on	the	
Kremlin.	As	a	result,	in	2017	Kaliningrad	Oblast	joined	the	narrow	group	of	
eight	Russian	regions	in	which	federal	financial	assistance	accounts	for	more	
than	60%	of	all	budget	revenues,	while	back	in	2015	it	this	figure	had	been	
only	30%.20	As	 it	 turned	out,	 though,	only	a	 few	residents	of	 the	zone	ben-
efited	 from	the	state	support,	and	 its	main	beneficiary	was	 the	automobile	
corporation	Avtotor,	which	cashed	in	80%	of	all	the	funds.21	
19	 See:	Администрация	Особой	экономической	зоны	в	Калининградской	области	2019.
20	 See:	Министерство	финансов	Калининградской	области	2019.
21	 No	information	is	available	on	the	amount	of	compensation	payments	to	Avtotor	in	2018,	al-
though	it	probably	remained	at	a	similar	level	as	in	2016	and	2017.	
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Chart 4. Kaliningrad Oblast’s budget revenues and expenditures
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Source: Ministry of Finance of the Kaliningrad Oblast
The	changes introduced on 1 January 2018	were	of	particular	importance	for	
the	region’s	economy	and	concerned,	among	others,	extending	the	application	
of	preferential	rules	until	2045	(by	14.5	years)	and	expanding	the	area	of	the	
SEZ	to	 include	sea	port	areas,	as	well	as	reducing	the	minimum	investment	
threshold	to	10	million	roubles	(US$	150,000)	for	health	care	investments	and	
to	1	million	roubles	(US$	15,000)	for	IT	projects.	Moreover,	SEZ	residents	can	
pay	reduced	social	security	premiums	and	a	zero	income	tax	rate	for	six	years	
after	the	first	year	with	a	recorded	profit,	and	in	the	next	six	years	they	can	
pay	half	of	the	regular	rate	(previously	similar	preferences	were	available	for	
six	years	from	the	granting	of	resident	status).	In	addition,	a	zero	VAT	rate	was	
introduced	for	the	carriage	of	passengers	and	luggage	by	air	(previously	10%	
VAT).	However,	the	of	electronic	business,	tourist	and	humanitarian	visas	in-
troduced	in	July	2019	will	be	of	key	importance	for	boosting	Kaliningrad’s	co-
operation	with	other	countries	and	for	attracting	foreign	investors	and	tour-
ists	(for	more	information	see	Chapter	III.2).	
Changes	introduced	in	2018	to	the	rules	of	how	the	SEZ	functions	mean	that	the	
number	of	entities	registered	as	resident	there	has	increased	by	70	(i.e.	by	30%),	
and	some	30%	of	the	newly	registered	businesses	were	IT	sector	companies.	The	
second-largest	 group	 of	 new	businesses	 comprised	 agricultural	 and	 foodstuff	
companies.22	In	2018,	Kate-Development,	an	automotive	gearbox	manufacturer	
owned	by	Yekaterina	Ignatova,	also	became	registered	in	the	zone.	Kate-Devel-
22	 Администрация	Особой	экономической	зоны,	op. cit. 
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opment	works	very	closely	with	the	state-owned	corporation	Rostec	controlled	
by	Yekaterina’s	husband	Sergei	Chemezov,	one	of	President	Putin’s	close	friends.	
It	 should	be	added	 that	 since	 taking	over	 the	Kaliningrad	Amber	Combine	 in	
2012,	Rostec	itself	has	also	been	present	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.
Less	than	300	businesses	currently	have	their	headquarters	registered	in	the	
SEZ.	At	the	beginning	of	2016	approximately	800	businesses	in	the	region	ben-
efited	from	the	reduced	tariffs	(available	within	the	SEZ	from	1996).
Avtotor
The joint-stock company Avtotor is one of the largest manufacturers of for-
eign car brands in Russia. Its plants currently assemble cars for BMW, Hyun-
dai, KIA, TATA Daewoo and FAW. The company recorded a peak volume of 
production in 2012 when it manufactured 265,000 vehicles. Since the slump 
in 2015 when its output decreased to around 90,000 cars, the company has 
been increasing its production volume. In 2017, the company recorded growth 
of over 50% and, according to preliminary data, its production increased by 
a further 40% in 2018 – to approximately 203,000 cars and trucks. Avtotor 
sales increased by 12% and 13% respectively in this period.
Avtotor is the cornerstone of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s economy, accounting for:
– around 50% of the Kaliningrad Oblast’s manufacturing sector; 
– 57% of the region’s maritime and rail container shipments; 
– 39% of taxes paid in the Kaliningrad Oblast. 
However, of the approximately 67 billion roubles of taxes paid in 2018, only 
approximately 1 billion roubles were allocated to the regional budget. The 
company could receive about 45 billion roubles (about US$ 0.8 billion) in 
compensation from the federal budget for the abolition of reduced tariffs 
in 2018.
It is not clear who the real owner of the corporation is. In the early 1990s, 
Vladimir Shcherbakov founded Avtotor (originally as a KIA assembly 
plant in the Kaliningrad Oblast) and according to media reports, he con-
trolled about 99.9% of the company. During the years of the Soviet Union, 
Shcherbakov worked as an engineer and then as a director in the VAZ and 
Kamaz car factories, then pursued a political career in Moscow and in 
1991 became the First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Economy 
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and Forecasting of the USSR (previously this department was called the 
State Committee for Economic Planning of the USSR). According to media 
reports, in 2016 Shcherbakov transferred his shares to his son Sergei, who 
lives in Switzerland. Sergei controls Avtotor through the Automotive De-
velopment Holding, registered in 2016 in Luxembourg and wholly owned 
by the Automotive Development Group Limited, registered in Hong Kong, 
also in 2016.
Considering that the Shcherbakov family does not belong to the core of 
the current Russian political and business elite, that it controls the plant 
through tax havens (at a time when President Putin is forcing Russian 
business to repatriate capital) and receives multi-billion-dollar compen-
sation from the state budget, it may be assumed that the real beneficiaries 
of the company are not the Shcherbakov family, but people from Putin’s 
inner circle.
2.2. Development of the potential of the energy sector
The	measures	taken	by	the	federal	authorities	in	the	energy	sector,	mainly	in	
the	gas	and	electricity	sectors,	are	also	part	of	the	strategy	to	further	isolate	
the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	
The launch of the “Marshal Vasilevsky” floating LNG regasification ter-
minal in January 2019	was	a	key	investment	in	ensuring	the	gas	self-suffi-
ciency	of	the	region.
The floating lNG regasification terminal in the Kaliningrad Oblast
The regasification capacity of the floating LNG regasification terminal is 
2.3 million tonnes (approximately 3.1 billion m3) and the storage capacity 
is 174,000 m3. The unit was manufactured at the Korean shipyard Hyun-
dai Heavy Industries in early January 2017, but due to damage to one of 
the regasification boilers it was handed over to Gazprom with an almost 
one-year delay, on 31 October 2018. Delays were also caused by the dam-
age to the coastal infrastructure due to the storm in the Baltic Sea in 
November 2017. The project also required the construction of the appro-
priate offshore infrastructure, i.e. a 3.5 km long sea gas pipeline, leading 
from the terminal to the land part of the port and the offshore infrastruc-
ture (see Map 2). The eventual cost of constructing the floating unit was  
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US$ 295 million (excluding VAT). The total budget including the costs 
of building the infrastructure in the Kaliningrad port (where Gennady 
Timchenko’s Stroytransneftegaz was the contractor) amounted to RUB 
60 billion (around 1 billion US$). 
The investment is part of the Russian strategy of strengthening the energy 
independence of the Kaliningrad Oblast. However, it is unlikely that the 
newly commissioned terminal will be fully utilised in the coming years. 
The	new	infrastructure	makes	it	possible	for	Gazprom	to	be	able	to	avoid	trans-
ferring	gas	to	the	oblast	through	a	pipeline	passing	through	Belarus	and	Lithu-
ania,	while	fully	satisfying	the	region’s	consumption	needs	(2.6	billion	m3	in	
2018).	However,	it	is	unlikely	that	in	the	coming	years	it	will	actually	reduce	
gas	transmission	via	the	current	transit	route.
The	chief	reason	for	this	is	that	Gazprom	remains	bound	by	a	transit	contract	
with	Lithuania	for	the	transmission	of	2.5	billion	m3	of	gas	annually	till	the	end	
of	2025.	In	fact	in	October	2018	its	representatives	announced	that	in	2019,	gas	
supplies	to	the	region	via	Belarus	and	Lithuania	would	increase	from	2.5	to	3.2	
billion	m3.
Secondly,	the	price	of	LNG	imported	to	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	would	be	higher	
than	the	price	of	gas	transmitted	through	the	gas	pipeline	system	(the	price	of	
gas	supplied	to	consumers	in	the	oblast	currently	amounts	to	approximately	
US$	 70	per	 1,000	m3,	while	LNG	prices	 on	 the	European	market	 ranged	be-
tween	US$	200–300	per	1,000	m3	in	2018).	In	addition,	Gazprom	would	not	be	
able	 to	supply	 its	own	LNG	to	the	terminal.	The	gas	 liquefaction	plant	being	
built	in	the	Leningrad	region,	near	the	Portovaya	compressor	station,	is	to	be	
commissioned	in	the	second	half	of	2019	and	its	production	capacity	is	set	to	
be	only	1.2	million	tonnes	(approximately	1.6	billion	m3),23	which	corresponds	
to	 only	61%	of	 the	 oblast’s	 consumption.	Alternatively,	 supplies	 of	 LNG	pur-
chased	by	Gazprom	on	spot	markets	would	generate	very	high	costs.	Thus	it	
will	be	up	to	the	Kremlin’s	political	decision	whether	or	not	pipeline	transit	
will	be	reduced	in	favour	of	LNG	supplies.
23	 The	contractor	for	the	investment	is	OOO	NIPI	NG	"Peton",	and	it	will	cost	127	billion	rou-
bles.	Gazprom	plans	to	sell	gas	from	the	LNG	terminal	in	Leningrad	Oblast	to	Finland	and	
Estonia.	‘Газпром	создал	подразделение,	ответственное	за	подачу	газа	в	Nord	Stream	
2’,	Нефтегазовое Обозрение,	22–28	февраля	2018	года,	pp.	37–38;	‘Небольшие	задержки.	
1-й	из	3-х	комплексов	СПГ	в	Ленинградской	области	запустят	в	феврале-марте	2019	г.’,	
Neftegaz.Ru,	15.02.2019.
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Map 2. Energy infrastructure in the Kaliningrad Oblast
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Meanwhile, the gas pipeline network in the region has been extended,	
which	is	an	element	of	Gazprom’s	nationwide	strategy	for	the	expansion	of	gas	
networks	 in	 the	Russian	Federation.24	 In	2016,	 the	25	kilometre-long	branch	
of	the	Minsk-Vilnius-Kaunas-Kaliningrad	gas	pipeline	to	Chernyakhovsk	was	
put	into	operation.	In	October	2017,	Gazprom	completed	the	expansion	of	two	
branches	of	the	pipeline	–	to	Gusev	and	to	Sovetsk.	This	increased	the	security	
of	supply	to	the	Mayakovskaya	and	Talakhovskaya	thermal	power	plants25	(see	
below).	The	gas	network	coverage	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	has	increased	from	
54.5%	 in	 2010	 to	 83.6%	 in	 2018.	This	 exceeds	 the	national	 average	 (68.6%)26.	
Alongside	the	development	of	the	aforementioned	branches,	Gazprom	opened	
three	automatic	gas	distribution	stations	–	in	Chernyakhovsk	in	August	2016,	
and	in	Sovetsk	and	Gusev	in	2017.	In	addition,	Kryogaz,	a	company	controlled	
by	 Gazprombank,	 is	 building	 a	 small	 LNG	 production	 plant	 in	 Kaliningrad	
with	an	annual	capacity	of	150,000	tonnes,	to	be	completed	in	2019.	
Gazprom has also been expanding its gas storage facilities in the Kalinin-
grad region.27	In	September	2013,	the	construction	of	the	first	two	gas	depots	
was	completed.	 In	December	2017	a	 further	 two	were	completed.	Their	 total	
capacity	 is	 currently	 174	million	m3.	Ultimately,	meaning	by	2025,	Gazprom	
plans	to	increase	their	number	to	14,	and	their	total	capacity	to	800	million	m3	
(daily	delivery	capacity	will	amount	to	12	million	m3).
The development of infrastructure enabling the use of natural gas as 
a car fuel	 is	 also	 an	 important	 element	 of	 the	 efforts	 to	 strengthen	 the	 re-
gion’s	energy	independence.	Gazprom	Gazomotornoye	Toplivo,	a	subsidiary	of	
Gazprom,	operates	a	small	LNG	and	CNG	plant	in	Kaliningrad	with	an	annual	
capacity	of	21,000	tonnes	(it	also	includes	a	gas	compression	station	with	a	pro-
duction	capacity	of	6,000	m3	per	day).28	On	24	December	2013,	Gazprom	Gazo-
motornoye	Toplivo	signed	an	agreement	with	the	government	of	the	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	to	promote	the	use	of	natural	gas	as	automotive	fuel.	At	the	end	of	
2016,	four	mobile	fuel	stations	were	opened	in	the	region	–	in	Bagrationovsk,	
24	 The	gas	network	expansion	programme	is	41%	financed	by	the	Russian	Federation's	regions,	
56%	by	Gazprom	and	3%	by	federal	funds	allocated	under	targeted	programmes.	
25	 ‘Поставки	природного	газа	потребителям	Калининградской	области’,	Gazprom,	27.01.2019.	
26	 ‘Виктор	Зубков:	в	Калининградской	области	есть	все	предпосылки	для	выхода	на	но-
вый	уровень	использования	природного	газа	на	транспорте’,	Gazprom,	29.05.2019.
27	 The	programme	was	initiated	in	2009.	
28	 ‘Компания	«Газпром	газомоторное	топливо»	приобрела	комплекс	по	производству	
СПГ	и	КПГ	в	Калининграде’,	Gasworld,	4.07.2014.
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Chernyakhovsk,	Kaliningrad	and	Sovetsk	–	offering	LNG	and	CNG	to	individ-
ual	customers.	According	to	2018	figures,	they	sold	2.2	million	m3	of	gas	to	cus-
tomers	(11	times	more	than	in	2015).29
As	regards	the	electricity	sector,	notwithstanding	the	suspension	of	 the	Ka-
liningrad	Nuclear	Power	Plant30	project,	Moscow has been developing elec-
tricity infrastructure in the Kaliningrad Oblast.	Before	March	2018,	three	
thermal	power	plants	were	in	operation	in	Kaliningrad	Oblast:	Kaliningrads-
kaya-1	(22.5	MW),	Kaliningradskaya-2	(875	MW)	and	Gusevskaya	(15.5	MW),	
as	well	as	three	hydroelectric	power	plants	of	little	significance	(Pravdinskaya,	
Ozerskaya,	Malaya	Zaozyornaya).	On	2	March	2018,	two	new	gas-fired	ther-
mal	power	plants,	Mayakovskaya	(in	Gusev)	and	Talakhovskaya	(in	Sovetsk),	
with	 a	 capacity	of	 156	MW	each,	were	officially	 commissioned.	On	6	March	
2019,	in	the	presence	of	Deputy	Prime	Minister	Dmitry	Kozak	and	Minister	of	
Energy	Alexander	Novak,	 the	Pregolskaya	gas-fired	 thermal	power	plant	 in	
the	Guryevsk	region	of	Kaliningrad	(with	a	capacity	of	455.2	MW)	was	com-
missioned.31	The	 total	 capacity	of	all	power	plants	operating	 in	 the	region	 is	
currently	approximately	1,667.2	MW,	which	represents	approximately	200%	
of	the	maximum	annual	electricity	demand	in	the	oblast.	
The	Primorskaya	coal-fired	power	plant	(with	a	capacity	of	195	MW)	is	under	
construction	 –	 it	 is	 scheduled	 to	 be	 commissioned	 in	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2020.	
The	cost	of	construction	of	the	four	facilities	(Mayakovskaya,	Talakhovskaya,	
Pregolskaya,	Primorskaya)	is	estimated	at	100	billion	roubles.	The	projects	are	
being	implemented	by	OOO	Kaliningradskaya	Generatsya,	almost	100%	con-
trolled	by	Rosneftegaz.	They	will	be	operated	by	Inter	RAO.32	
The	current	electricity	demand	in	the	Kaliningrad	region	is	up	to	830	MW	per	
year.	Moscow	has	indicated	that	the	expansion	of	the	generation	capacity	by	
29	 ‘Виктор	Зубков:	в	Калининградской	области	есть	все	предпосылки	для	выхода	на	
новый	уровень	использования	природного	газа	на	транспорте’,	op. cit.
30	 The	plans	to	build	two	nuclear	power	plant	units	with	a	total	capacity	of	2,300	MW	was	sus-
pended	in	June	2013.	For	more	information	on	the	project,	see:	J.	Rogoża,	A.	Wierzbowska-
Miazga,	I.	Wiśniewska,	A captive island: Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU	[series:	“OSW	
Studies”,	no.	41],	Warsaw	2012,	pp.	39–41.
31	 Е.	Вавина,	‘Калининградская	область	добилась	энергетической	независимости’,	
Ведомости,	7.03.2019.
32	 ‘Газпром	планирует	развитие	в	Калининградской	области	объектов	газовой	
генерации	–	Миллер’,	Нефтегазовое Обозрение,	25–31	августа	2016	года,	pp.	46–47.	OAO	
Pervouralskiy	Novotrubny	Zavod	is	the	supplier	of	pipes	for	the	Pregolskaya	and	Primors-
kaya	heat	and	power	plants.	
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approximately	950	MW	is	related	to	the	projected	increase	in	consumption	in	
Kaliningrad	Oblast	by	as	much	as	100%	by	2020.	In	addition,	it	has	been	noted	
that	 the	 investments	are	also	 intended	 to	provide	security	 in	 the	event	 that	
renovation	work	is	needed	or	it	will	otherwise	be	necessary	to	shut	down	the	
existing	CHP	plants.	
The	ongoing	expansion	of	power	capacity	is	not	merely	a	part	of	the	strength-
ening	 of	 the	 region’s	 energy	 self-sufficiency	 –	 it	 is	 also	 intended	at enabling 
the discontinuation of electricity transmission through Lithuania in the 
event of the planned desynchronisation of the Baltic states with	the	post-
Soviet	power	grid	by	2025.	Although	the	energy	needs	of	the	Kaliningrad	region	
are	already	satisfied	by	local	power	plants,	reserve	capacity	is	being	provided	by	
power	plants	 in	mainland	Russia,	which	are	connected	 to	Kaliningrad	Oblast	
via	power	grids	passing	through	the	territory	of	Lithuania.	The	first	attempt	to	
operate	the	Kaliningrad	system	in	isolated	mode	in	2014	failed.	A	72-hour	trial	of	
isolated	operation	of	the	power	system	of	the	Kaliningrad	region	was	successful-
ly	conducted	in	May	2019,	as	confirmed	by	Anton	Alikhanov	on	20th	June	2019.33
2.3. Development of the transport potential
In	the	last	two	years	an increase in spending on the transport sector in the 
Kaliningrad region could be observed. On	the	one	hand,	the aim of these 
measures has been to reduce its transport dependence on transit through 
Lithuania, Belarus or Poland	by	expanding	the	seaports	and	the	airport.	On	
the	other,	these investments are intended to make it possible to use the 
transit potential of the region, particularly for the dynamically growing 
transport between Asia and Europe. To	this	end,	development	of	the	railway	
and	port	infrastructure	of	the	region	had	been	particularly	promoted.
The	region	tries	to	make	use	of	its	transport assets,	including	the	two	railway	
stations	in	Kaliningrad	and	Chernyakhovsk	located	at	the	junction	of	standard	
(1,435	mm)	and	broad	 (1,520	mm)	gauge	 tracks,	as	well	as	 its	ports,	Russia’s	
only	ice-free	seaports	in	the	Baltic	Sea.
The	 actions	 taken	 so	 far	 by	 the	 Russian	 authorities,	 especially	 in	 the	 last	
two	 years,	 have	 resulted	 in	 the	 creation of two transport and logis-
tics centres (TLC) in the Kaliningrad Oblast: in Kaliningrad at the 
33	 ‘Калининградская	энергосистема	успешно	прошла	тест	на	работу	в	изолированном	
режиме’,	Переток.ру,	20.06.2019.
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Dzerzhinskaya-Novaya station and in Chernyakhovsk,	 which	 are	 capa-
ble	 of	 transhipping	 goods	 from	Russian	 to	European	wagons	 and	vice	 versa	
(see	Map	3).	 In	both	cases,	Kaliningrad	Railways	 (part	of	Russian	Railways)	
used	the	existing	railway	infrastructure,	the	expansion	and	modernisation	of	
which	has	so	far	cost	more	than	US$	5	million.	As	a	result,	in	2017,	it	was	pos-
sible	to	reload	coal	to	European	rail	carriages	in	the	territory	of	Russia	for	the	
first	time	(so	far	the	reloading	was	carried	out	in	Poland	or	Belarus),	and	to	re-
load	containers	in	transit	from	Europe	to	China	from	European	to	Russian	car-
riages.	Further	work	is	being	carried	out	both	on	the	development	of	the	land	
railway	route	through	Poland	and	on	the	multimodal	railway	connection	from	
China	through	Kaliningrad	Oblast	and	further	on	to	the	ports	of	Kaliningrad	
and	Rotterdam.	In	2018	test	train	shipments	were	carried	out	on	these	routes.	
As	a	result,	rail	freight	transport	increased	by	about	17%	in	2018.34	
The ambition of the Russian authorities is to create an industrial park 
around the terminal in Chernyakhovsk which will specialise in trans-
port and logistics, and in the production of building materials.	This	pro-
ject,	 currently	 in	 the	pre-investment	phase,	was	modelled	on	 the	 industrial	
park	and	dry	port	in	Khorgos	on	the	border	between	China	and	Kazakhstan.35	
The success of the plans to create a transport hub in the Kaliningrad region 
will largely depend on the shape of Russia’s relations with Lithuania and 
Poland, through which the trains have to transit.	For	the	time	being,	the	Rus-
sian	side	is	conducting	talks	on	railway	connections	primarily	at	the	business	
level,	i.e.	with	the	other	railway	companies	which	would	be	involved	in	transit.	
Moscow’s	policy	on	transport	tariffs	and	its	readiness	to	subsidise	them	is	also	
a	key	issue	for	the	project.	Federal	subsidies	intended	to	compensate	Kaliningrad	
entrepreneurs	 for	part	of	 the	railway	freight	 tariffs	were	withdrawn	in	2018,	
as	 the	money	was	redirected	(among	others	aims)	 to	 the	construction	of	new	
ferries	to	operate	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	maritime	connection	with	Russia.	It	
has	been	estimated	that	the	cost	of	rail	freight	transport	from/to	Kaliningrad	
through	Lithuania	and	Belarus	is	about	40%	more	expensive	than	transporting	
goods	over	the	same	distance	within	Russia.	For	example,	the	Avtotor	factory	
importing	car	assembly	parts	from	South	Korea	has	decided	not	to	change	its	de-
livery	route	because,	even	though	train	delivery	times	could	have	been	reduced	
to	12	days	from	the	current	45	days,	sea	freight	still	turned	out	to	cost	almost	50%	
less	than	rail	freight.	
34	 See:	Калининградская	железная	дорога	2019.
35	 See:	Корпорация	развития	Калининградской	области,	2019.
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Map 3. Transport infrastructure in the Kaliningrad Oblast 
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The	Russian	authorities	have	also	taken	measures	to	improve transport se-
curity and the security of supplies	 to	 the	 region	which	 is	 dependent	 on	
external	supplies	of	raw	materials	and	commodities.	This	is	to	be	achieved	by	
expanding	the	port	infrastructure	and	the	airport	to	enable	the	transport	of	
goods	and	people	without	transit.	The	construction	of	a	deep-water interna-
tional freight and passenger terminal in Pionersky,36 to	be	commissioned	
in	the	autumn	of	2019,	is	another	important	element	in	the	development	of	
the	region’s	transshipment	potential.	Worth	an	estimated	7.3	billion	roubles,	
the	project	involves	reconstructing	and	expanding	the	port	infrastructure	in	
Pionersky37	with	access	to	the	high	seas.	The	terminal	will	be	capable	of	han-
dling	approximately	300,000	passengers	per	year	and	up	to	90,000	freight	
vehicles.	The	new	port,	which	will	also	be	able	to	accommodate	large	cruise	
ships,	will	primarily	help	to	increase	the	number	of	tourists	visiting	the	re-
gion.38	The	project	is	being	carried	out	by	the	Samara-based	Bolverk	company	
(owned	by	Stanislav	Loban).
The	Russian	government	is,	moreover,	considering	the	construction	of	a	deep-
water	cargo	port	in	the	town	of	Yantarny.	The	decision	is	expected	in	autumn	
2019.	The	port	will	have	a	cargo	handling	capacity	of	48	million	tonnes	(includ-
ing	a	container	terminal	with	a	capacity	of	35	million	tonnes)	and	is	expected	
to	cost	RUB	200	billion,	of	which	50	billion	would	come	from	the	state	budget.39
The	 incorporation	of	 the	Kaliningrad	ports	 into	 the	SEZ	 in	2018	means	 that	
companies	 registered	 in	 the	ports	 are	 able	 to	benefit	 from	 the	SEZ’s	prefer-
ential	rule.	 It	 is	also	an	important	factor	contributing	to	the	development	of	
the	ports’	potential	and	should	make	Kaliningrad’s	ports	more	attractive.	Cur-
rently	only	less	than	a	third	of	their	potential	is	used	(they	are	able	to	reload	
approximately	45	million	tonnes	of	goods	annually,	while	in	2017	they	reloaded	
only	approximately	14	million	tonnes).	Kaliningrad’s	ports	are	controlled	by	
the	state-owned	company	Rosmorport.	
36	 See:	Морское строительство и технологии 2019.
37	 Back	in	Soviet	times,	Pionersky	hosted	the	USSR’s	ocean	fishing	fleet	base.
38	 The	port	of	Kaliningrad	is	accessible	via	a	40-kilometre-long	9–10.5	m	deep	channel	which	
is	not	suitable	for	ocean-class	vessels.	The	port	of	Pionersky	will	be	connected	to	the	Kalin-
ingrad	Oblast's	road	infrastructure	and	Kaliningrad	will	be	accessible	by	an	express	road.	
See:	Ю.	Парамонова,	‘Грузопассажирский	терминал:	может	не	сработать?’,	RuGrad.EU,	
14.05.2018.
39	 А.	Веденеева,	О.	Мордюшенко,	‘Новый	порт	—	янтарными	темпами’,	Коммерсантъ,	
27.05.2019.
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The	Russian	government’s	decision	to	build	two	new	ferries	to	service	intra-
Russian	transport	on	the	Baltiysk–Ust-Luga	route	has	also	played	a	significant	
role	in	the	development	of	alternative	transport	routes:	the	first	ferry	is	to	ar-
rive	in	the	region	in	2020	(in	2018,	approximately	US$	80	million	was	allocated	
from	the	federal	budget	for	this	purpose).	At	present,	this	connection	is	served	
by	two	ferries	built	back	in	the	1980s,	which	often	fail.	In	addition,	a	significant	
part	of	the	transport	capacity	of	the	ferries	is	reserved	by	the	Russian	Ministry	
of	Defence	for	the	transport	of	troops	and	military	equipment	to	and	from	the	
Kaliningrad	Oblast.	
The	 expansion of Khrabrovo Airport,	 completed	 in	 2018	 before	 the	 FIFA	
World	Cup,	has	been	very	 important	 for	 increasing	 regional	passenger	 traf-
fic	without	the	need	to	use	transit	routes.	The	airport	is	owned	by	Novaport,	
a	company	controlled	by	the	billionaire	Roman	Trotsenko,	who	is	(among	his	
other	roles)	an	advisor	 to	 the	president	of	state-owned	Rosneft,	 Igor	Sechin.	
Khrabrovo	Airport	is	now	capable	of	accommodating	aircraft	of	almost	all	siz-
es.	In	2018,	it	handled	2.1	million	passengers,	i.e.	20%	more	than	in	the	previous	
year,	and	its	current	capacity	is	3	million	passengers	per	year.	The	ambition	of	
the	airport	is	to	become	a	regional	tourist	hub	and	take	over	some	of	the	traf-
fic	currently	handled	by	other	airports,	especially	Gdansk,	which	Kaliningrad	
citizens	often	use	to	travel	around	the	world.	This	is	why	international	flights	
from	Kaliningrad	have	been	 launched	by	Pobeda,	a	Russian	 low-cost	airline	
belonging	to	the	Aeroflot	Group.	However,	its	offer	is	currently	rather	modest	
(Rome	and,	in	the	summer	season,	flights	to	Paris	are	also	to	be	launched).	
2.4. Investments in the region as a way to fund oligarchs
Several	large	federally	funded	infrastructure	projects	have	been	carried	out	in	
the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	in	the	last	few	years,	even	while	the	Kremlin	was	imple-
menting	a	policy	of	federal	budget	consolidation	and	cutting	public	spending.
During	 the	 implementation	 phase	 these	 projects	 have	 undoubtedly	 contrib-
uted	to	the	dynamic	growth	of	investments	in	the	region,	providing	employ-
ment	 and	 contracts	 for	many	 local	businesses	 in	 recent	years.	 In	 the	 longer	
term,	however,	some	projects,	such	as	investments	in	the	energy	sector	or	the	
football	 stadium,	will	become	a	financial	burden	 for	 their	 investors	and	 the	
regional	budget.
Therefore,	it	seems	that	the	main	motivation	behind	those	projects	was,	first-
ly,	to	strengthen	the	state’s	security	through	the	development	of	the	region’s	
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energy	and	transport	potential,	secondly,	to	boost	Kaliningrad’s	international	
prestige	associated	with	the	organisation	of	the	World	Cup	2018,	and	thirdly,	to	
siphon off state funds to the private accounts of selected oligarchs through 
the implementation of expensive investment projects financed from the 
state budget.	The	economic	development	of	the	region	or,	more	broadly,	of	the	
Russian	economy,	was	much	less	important.	
The	construction	(estimated	at	100	billion	roubles)	of	the	four	new	power	plants	
in	the	region	(Mayakovskaya,	Talakhovskaya,	Pregolskaya,	Primorskaya)	was	
carried	out	by	Igor	Sechin’s	Rosneftegaz.	Whereas	the	construction	of	the	float-
ing	 land	part	LNG	regasification	terminal	was	carried	out	by	Gennady	Tim-
chenko’s	Stroytransgaz.	Timchenko	is	one	of	President	Putin’s	closest	friends	
(for	more	information	see	Chapter	II.2.2).
The	2018 World Cup in Russia	has	turned	out	to	be	the	most	expensive	FIFA	
World	Cup	of	all	time,	consuming	more	than	US$	13	billion.	Its organisation 
was largely financed from the state budget and benefited the business 
environment of the president:	companies	controlled	by	Putin’s	friends	were	
the	main	winners	of	tenders	for	the	construction	of	sports	and	transport	fa-
cilities.40	Kaliningrad	was	one	of	 the	eleven	cities	hosting	matches.	The Ka-
liningrad stadium was	financed	from	the	federal	budget.	Its	main	contractor	
was	the	state-owned	company	Sport	Engineering	controlled	by	the	Ministry	
of	Sport,	headed	by	Minister	Vitaly	Mutko.	It	was	one	of	the	most	expensive	
in	terms	of	the	cost	per	one	seat	(even	though	the	construction	of	a	retractable	
roof	was	 abandoned	during	 the	project).	 Its	 budget	 grew	 rapidly	during	 the	
construction	largely	because	of	its	location	on	the	marshy	island	of	Oktyabrsky	
in	the	city	centre.	The	final	investment	cost	was	about	70%	higher	than	initially	
planned	and	amounted	to	17.5	billion	roubles.	Moreover,	another	10	billion	rou-
bles	was	spent	on	the	construction	of	access	infrastructure	and	development	
of	the	area	around	the	stadium.41	However,	thanks	to	this	capital-intensive	in-
vestment,	attractive	development	areas	on	the	island	of	Oktyabrsky	have	been	
40	 For	more	information	see:	I.	Wiśniewska,	J.	Rogoża,	‘The	2018	FIFA	World	Cup	in	Russia	–	cir-
cuses	instead	of	bread?’	[series:	“OSW	Commentaries”,	no.	286],	17.09.2018.	
41	 The	contract	for	the	eastern	flyover	connecting	Oktyabrsky	Island	with	the	mainland,	worth	
approximately	5	billion	roubles,	was	awarded	to	VAD	(under	Western	sanctions	for	activi-
ties	in	Crimea)	owned	by	Valery	Abramov	and	Viktor	Perevalov.	For	several	years	now,	the	
company	has	been	carrying	out	large	public	procurement	projects,	most	likely	thanks	to	
the	support	of	Arkady	Rotenberg,	according	to	the	Russian	media.	For	more	information	
about	the	stadium	construction	and	access	infrastructure	project:	М.	Алфимов,	‘Самый	
проблемный	стадион	ЧМ-2018.	На	песке	украли	750	млн	рублей’,	Sports.ru,	31.03.2018.
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expanded,	which	are	currently	at	 the	disposal	of	 the	governor	of	 the	region	
(a	cultural	and	entertainment	complex	and	a	tax	haven	for	companies	relocat-
ing	their	operations	from	abroad	are	among	the	facilities	that	will	be	created	
there).	Preparation	and	reinforcement	of	the	terrain	for	the	stadium	not	only	
required	expanding	the	budget	and	extending	the	project	schedule,	it	also	at-
tracted	corruption.	The	Russian	oligarch	Ziyavudin	Magomedov,	whose	com-
pany	was	responsible	for	these	works,	is	currently	in	custody	on	charges	con-
cerning,	inter	alia,	the	execution	of	this	contract.	However,	problems	with	the	
stadium	had	emerged	and	its	costs	had	started	growing	already	at	the	design	
stage,	which	was	finally	taken	care	of	without	a	tender	by	Crocus	International	
S.A.,	a	company	owned	by	the	oligarch	Araz	Agalarov.	
The	stadium	is	to	become	the	property	of	the	regional	authorities	in	2019,	al-
though	the	federal	budget	has	committed	itself	to	financing	most	of	its	operat-
ing	 costs	until	 2023.	The	regional	 authorities	 argue	 that it is impossible to 
maintain the stadium with revenues from organising matches of Kalin-
ingrad Baltika Football Club or other sports and cultural events, as the 
government assumes will be the case.	The	Ministry	of	Sport	of	the	Russian	
Federation	has	estimated	the	costs	of	operating	the	stadium	in	Kaliningrad	for	
the	years	2019–2021	at	1	billion	roubles.	
There	are	also	many	doubts	about	the	profitability	and	advisability	of	another	
large	 investment	project	 the	Russian	authorities	are	planning	 in	 the	region:	
the construction of a cultural complex on the island of Oktyabrsky.	This	
will	house:	branches	of	the	Bolshoi	in	Moscow	and	the	largest	Russian	muse-
ums	(the	St.	Petersburg	Hermitage	and	the	Moscow	Tretyakov	Gallery),	and	
others.	The	complex	is	expected	to	cost	nearly	twice	as	much	as	the	stadium.	
The	contract	has	been	awarded	 to	 the	Stroygazmontazh	 company	owned	by	
Arkady	Rotenberg,	one	of	President	Putin’s	closest	friends.42	According	to	esti-
mates	by	President	Putin’s	advisor	Andrei	Belousov,	the	annual	maintenance	
costs	of	this	facility	after	it	is	put	into	operation	in	2023	may	reach	3	billion	
roubles,	and	it	has	not	been	decided	how	this	is	going	to	be	covered.	In	the	fu-
ture,	the	complex	may	therefore	become	a	drain	on	the	regional	budget.	
42	 Similar	investments	have	been	planned	in	Vladivostok	and	Samara.	The	total	amount	of	the	
contract	for	the	three	complexes,	which	Rotenberg's	Stroygazmontazh	should	complete	by	
2023,	amounts	to	at	least	80	billion	roubles.	For	more	information,	see:	Т.	Дзядко,	‘Музеи	
от	Ротенберга:	как	бизнесмен	заработает	на	культурных	проектах’, РБК,	15.11.2018.
PR
A
C
E 
O
SW
  0
9/
20
12
50
O
SW
 R
EP
O
R
T 
 1
0/
20
19
Chart 5. Recent large infrastructural projects in the Kaliningrad Oblast
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2.5. Kaliningrad as a tax haven
In	July	2018,	the	Kremlin	chose	Kaliningrad	and	Vladivostok	as	the	locations	
for	its	“special	administrative	zones”	(SAZ),	i.e.	tax	havens.	In	Kaliningrad	this	
zone	is	located	on	the	island	of	Oktyabrsky	(currently	the	location	of	the	city’s	
football	stadium).	Creating	the	SAZ	in	Russia	is	the	Kremlin’s	idea	to	support	
Russian	entrepreneurs	who	have	been	subjected	to	Western	sanctions	and	are	
having	difficulties	doing	business	abroad.	However,	it	is	a	way	of	encouraging	
Russian	oligarchs	 to	 transfer	capital	 that	was	previously	kept	 in	 tax	havens	
back	to	Russia.	
Only	legal	persons	who	are	not	from	the	financial	sector	and	who	relocate	their	
operations	to	Kaliningrad	from	abroad	can	become	residents	of	the	SAZ	in	Ka-
liningrad.	They	are	obliged	to	invest	at	least	50	million	roubles	(approximately	
US$	0.8	million)	in	Russia	(but	not	necessarily	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast)	with-
in	six	months	of	registration.	In	return,	they	can	benefit	from	low	taxation	and	
simplified	inspections.	Residents	of	the	zone	will	be	exempt	from	the	tax	on	
the	sale	of	assets	and	income	from	dividends,	and	will	benefit	from	a	reduced	
(5%)	rate	on	dividends	from	shares	of	holding	companies.43
As	of	the	end	of	May	2019,	eight	companies	had	their	headquarters	registered	
in	 the	 Kaliningrad	 zone.	 Adanimov	 Trading	 Limited	 (previously	 registered	
in	Cyprus),	owned	by	Omsk	businessmen	Ilia	and	Gennady	Fridman,	was	the	
first	to	register.	In	May	2019,	seven	companies	related	to	Oleg	Deripaska,	a	Rus-
sian	oligarch	who	has	been	subject	to	US	sanctions	since	April	2018,	became	
registered	 in	 the	 zone:	 Trans	 Segtor	Holdings,	 Samolus	 Investments,	 Prime	
Emerald	Trading,	Fenestraria	Consultants,	Langdale	Holding,	Rasperia	Trad-
ing,	Ceratozamia	Consultants.
In	autumn	2018,	readiness	 to	apply	 for	resident	status	was	also	signalled	by	
En+	and	its	controlled	aluminium	corporation	Rusal	(of	which	Oleg	Deripaska	
was	also	the	majority	owner	until	recently).	En+	and	Rusal	were	also	subjected	
to	US	sanctions	in	April	2018,	but	as	Deripaska	reduced	his	share	in	these	com-
panies	to	below	50%,	in	January	2019	the	US	administration	lifted	the	restric-
tions	on	them.	However,	as	of	the	end	of	May	2019,	the	new	owners	had	not	
applied	for	the	status	of	zone	resident.
43	 See:	Н.	Еремина,	‘Сдавайте	валюту:	зачем	России	понадобились	офшоры’,	Gazeta.ru,	
29.07.2018.
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III.  The KAlININGrAd OblAST ANd ITS exTerNAl 
eNvIrONMeNT
1. cross-border political relations 
The Kaliningrad Oblast’s cross-border relations with the outside world 
are subordinated to the logic of Russia’s authoritarian system of govern-
ment and the increasingly centralised way in which Moscow has gov-
erned the regions for several years. This means that Kaliningrad cannot 
independently choose the directions and forms of its external co-opera-
tion. Its external policy is shaped and controlled by the federal authori-
ties. However, even though the relations between the Kaliningrad Oblast 
and its neighbours are significantly influenced by the status of the Krem-
lin’s relations with its foreign partners, they are still noticeably better 
that Russia’s intergovernmental relations.
At	the	state	level,	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	bilateral	relations	with	Poland	and	
Lithuania	soured	in	2014,	the	year	of	Russia’s	aggression	against	Ukraine	and	
escalation	of	its	anti-West	propaganda.	Yet	despite	the	inter-state	tensions,	bi-
lateral	relations	between	regions	have	remained	correct,	even	as	Poland	sus-
pended	the	agreement	on	local	border	traffic	in	2016	and	stepped	up	prepara-
tions	to	cut	a	navigable	canal	across	the	Vistula	Spit	in	2018.	
The problem of navigation on the vistula lagoon in Polish-russian 
relations 
As a result of territorial changes after World War II, the territory of the 
former German East Prussia, including the Vistula Lagoon, was divided 
between the USSR and Poland. Therefore, the only waterway connect-
ing the baltic Sea with the vistula lagoon and the port in elbląg led 
from now through the baltiysk Strait, situated entirely within the 
territory of the uSSr. The rules of navigation through the straits and the 
Vistula Lagoon were established by the protocol to the Polish-Soviet agree-
ment on the state border of 16 August 1945. In accordance with the protocol, 
the USSR guaranteed the free movement of merchant ships under the Pol-
ish flag to and from Poland in peacetime. Access of third country vessels 
was subject to the decision of the Soviet authorities. Since July 1991, Poland 
has been holding talks with the USSR and then with the Russian Federation 
regarding the signing of a new agreement. Poland has sought, among other 
things, free access to this waterway for third country vessels. The Russian 
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side was against this because the port of Baltiysk in the Baltiysk Strait was 
the main base of the Russian (and previously Soviet) Baltic Fleet. For this 
reason, and in connection with the plans to develop the port of Elbląg, in 
1993 Poland put forward the idea of a Vistula Spit canal to create an alter-
native waterway, but for a long time this project remained in the sphere of 
broad concepts. In 2004, Russia tightened the rules for foreign ships to use 
the route through the Baltiysk Strait, and in 2006 it completely blocked it. 
Navigation became possible again after the September 2009signing of the 
Polish-Russian agreement on the terms of navigation (providing for free-
dom of movement for merchant ships of Poland and Russia, which could 
be temporarily restricted on the grounds of environmental or security and 
defence considerations). Third country vessel traffic was allowed on a lim-
ited basis under the unilateral Russian regulation of July 2009, which could 
be withdrawn at any time. It requires vessels to apply for a permit to pass 
the straits 15 days in advance. The cost of the permit is 50 euros per vessel. 
In practice, this system is not being widely used. In 2006–2007 and again 
in 2016, the Polish government returned to the idea of cutting a navigable 
canal through the Vistula Spit. In February 2017 the act on this issue was 
adopted, in December 2018 a tender for the execution of the investment was 
announced, and in February 2019 a building permit was issued and pre-
paratory works were commenced.
Map 4. Projected Vistula Spit Canal
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According to the Polish government’s plans, the navigable canal through 
the vistula Spit is to be built in the area of the former village of Nowy 
Świat, it will be 1,260 m long, 20 to 60 m wide and 5 m deep. The infra-
structure is to include a lock, storm gates, breakwaters, two drawbridges, 
a parking position and border crossing facilities. The canal will allow the 
passage of ships and vessels with a length of up to 100 m, up to 20 m wide 
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and with a draught of up to 4 m. The expected cost of the project is PLN 880 
million, and the investment is to be completed by 2022. The official goal of 
the project is to create a new waterway independent of Russia, connecting 
the Baltic Sea, via the Vistula Lagoon, with the port in Elbląg. This will al-
low for the port to be expanded and for increasing revenues from freight 
transport. The canal is also intended to increase tourist traffic in the region 
(including sailing) and to improve defence capabilities by allowing access 
to small naval and border guard vessels. 
The project to build a navigable canal through the Vistula Spit on the terri-
tory of Poland is causing negative reactions in russia, both at the official 
level and in the media, although official reactions have so far been limited 
to the lower political levels. As far as the federal authorities are concerned, 
in September 2017 the Minister for the Environment and Natural Resourc-
es of the Russian Federation, Sergei Donskoy, sent a letter to Jan Szyszko, 
the Polish Minister for the Environment, calling on the Polish authorities 
to provide the neighbouring states with comprehensive information on the 
project and to consult with Russia on its potential harmful consequences 
before taking a final decision on the implementation of the project. In Au-
gust 2018, the Deputy Minister for Agriculture and the Head of the Federal 
Fisheries Agency of the Russian Federation, Ilya Shestakov, sent an official 
letter to the EU Commissioner for the Environment, Maritime Affairs and 
Fisheries, Karmenu Vella, complaining that the Polish authorities did not 
consult the draft with the Russian side, drawing attention to potential envi-
ronmental and economic threats to Russia and calling for an analysis of the 
problem and for preventive measures to be taken. In December 2018, a com-
muniqué was published stating that the Minister for Natural Resources 
and the Environment, Dmitry Kobylkin, had expressed his concern about 
the project in a conversation with his Polish counterpart Henryk Kowal-
czyk during the climate summit in Katowice, and had called for an envi-
ronmental impact assessment and consultations to be conducted. Critical 
opinions about the project have been expressed by individual members of  
the Russian Parliament and the Human Rights Council of the President  
of the Russian Federation (in a statement issued in February 2019).
As far as the Kaliningrad authorities are concerned, in March 2017 the act-
ing governor Anton Alikhanov announced his decision to establish a special 
working group consisting of 17 people: officials, experts and environmental 
activists, whose task would be to analyse the (mainly environmental) ef-
fects of the Polish project on the region. According to media reports, this 
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group prepared a report in the summer of 2017 (not published), which was 
forwarded to Moscow to the Ministry of Natural Resources and the En-
vironment. In his statements, Alikhanov has suggested that the project, 
which could cause environmental and economic damage to the region, is 
more of a political, military and strategic project than an economic one, but 
the regional authorities do not want to “lecture the Poles”, although they 
do expect them to consult with the Russian side (April 2017). On another 
occasion he stated that the project may have a negative impact on the envi-
ronmental situation in the Vistula Lagoon, but the regional authorities are 
not treating it as a threat (January 2019). Critical views of the project have 
been expressed by Kaliningrad officials, experts and environmental activ-
ists speaking to the media. The Kaliningrad news outlets have provided ex-
tensive information about the successive decisions of the Polish authorities 
concerning the project and have reported on the debate on the project in 
Poland, mainly quoting critical opinions. 
The Russian narrative on the canal project is mainly about environmental 
concerns. In particular, it has been argued that it will increase the salinity 
of the waters of the Vistula Lagoon and threaten its populations of fresh-
water fish (which will cause losses to fisheries in the Kaliningrad region), 
threaten bird habitats and disturb the migration routes of migratory spe-
cies, change the layout of sea currents and have a negative impact on the 
Vistula Spit coasts. In 2017, Russian commentators started to raise security 
arguments more often. In their view, the canal would contribute to a mili-
tarisation of the Polish border area, lead to the creation of new Polish and 
NATO military installations (some Russian statements allege it concerns, 
among other issues, the planned reclaimed silt island on the Vistula La-
goon), thus creating new threats to the Kaliningrad Oblast’s military secu-
rity. Political and legal arguments have also been raised. Poland has been 
accused of failing to consult the project with the Russian side, despite it 
negatively affecting the Kaliningrad Oblast. This amounts to a violation of 
international law, as does the unilateral decision to transform a section of 
the Vistula Spit into an island (in reality Russia is not a party to the inter-
national Espoo Convention on cross-border environmental impact assess-
ments and as such cannot enforce any rights under it and can only rely on 
the good will of the Polish side).
Despite the worsened relations, both Poland and Lithuania have main-
tained cross-border contacts with the Kaliningrad Oblast on issues 
important for both sides, both within the framework of national 
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cooperation programmes and within the framework of programmes ap-
proved and financed by the European Union.
Interregional cooperation between Polish voivodeships (Pomeranian	and	
Warmia-Masuria) and the Kaliningrad Oblast takes	place	within	the	frame-
work	of	the	Polish-Russian	Council	for	the	Cooperation	of	Regions	of	the	Re-
public	of	Poland	with	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	of	 the	Russian	Federation	 (the	
last	meeting	was	held	in	October	2016	in	Olsztyn).	Eleven	thematic	committees	
operate	within	 the	 council,	 including	 the	 committees	 for:	 border	 crossings,	
transport,	agriculture,	culture,	sport,	and	tourism	and	environmental	protec-
tion.	Despite	 the	 suspension	of	official	 contacts	at	 the	council	 level,	ongoing	
working	contacts	have	been	maintained,	including	between	border	guards.	
Contact	also	takes	the	form	of	meetings	of:	the	chambers	of	industry	and	com-
merce,	 joint	 economic	 forums	such	as	 the	Baltic	Business	Forum,	 study	vis-
its	by	municipal	government	representatives,	and	 joint	projects	(such	as	the	
Gothic	castles	route	implemented	jointly	with	the	Pomeranian	Voivodeship).	
In	October	2016	(on	the	occasion	of	the	council	meeting)	a	Polish-Russian	fo-
rum	for	business	cooperation	took	place	in	Olsztyn	with	the	participation	of	
130	Polish	companies,	and	in	December	2016	Kaliningrad	hosted	the	third	sem-
inar	“Economic	Cooperation	of	Poland	with	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	–	Warmia	
and	Masuria:	traditions	and	new	opportunities	for	cooperation”,	attended	by	
the	marshal	of	the	Warmia-Masuria	Voivodeship,	Gustaw	Marek	Brzezin	and	
the	acting	Governor	of	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	Anton	Alikhanov.	During	the	
seminar,	the	work	plan	of	the	Warmia-Masuria	Voivodeship	and	Kaliningrad	
Oblast	for	2017–2019	(including	in	the	field	of	tourism)	was	adopted.	In	April	
2018,	a	delegation	of	the	Olsztyn	authorities	headed	by	the	mayor	of	the	city,	
Piotr	Grzymowicz,	visited	Kaliningrad	on	the	occasion	of	25	years	of	coopera-
tion.	Every	year,	the	Forum	of	Partner	Regions	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	takes	
place	in	the	oblast	with	the	participation	of	representatives	of	Poland,	Lithua-
nia,	Germany,	Finland,	Belarus,	Norway	and	Estonia.	The	most	recent	one	was	
held	in	Kaliningrad	in	June	2019.	The	Forum	provides	an	opportunity	for	the	
presentation	of	the	current	implementation	status	of	the	Poland-Russia	Cross-
border	Co-operation	Programme	2014–2020.	Representatives	of	local	authori-
ties	also	meet	within	the	framework	of	the	Forum	of	South	Baltic	Parliaments.	
Bilateral	cooperation	 is	also	part	of	 the	broader	 framework	of	 the	European	
Union’s	strategy	for	its	Eastern	neighbourhood.	In	2007–2013,	the	Lithuania-
Poland-Russia	cooperation	programme	was	implemented,	financed	by	the	Eu-
ropean	Neighbourhood	and	Partnership	Instrument.	In	the	current	financial	
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perspective	for	the	years	2014–2020,	the	trilateral	programme	has	been	divid-
ed	into	two	programmes:	Polish-Russian	(Poland-Russia	Cross-border	Cooper-
ation	Programme	2014–2020)	and	a	similar	Lithuanian-Russian	programme.	
The	Cross-Border	Cooperation	Programme	was	launched	at	the	beginning	of	
2018	 (in	December	 2016	 it	was	 approved	 by	 the	European	Commission,	 and	
a	 year	 later	 a	 financing	 agreement	was	 signed	 between	 Poland,	 Russia	 and	
the	 European	 Commission).	 On	 the	 Polish	 side,	 it	 involves	 the	 Pomeranian,	
Warmia-Masuria	and	Podlaskie	Voivodeships	and,	on	the	Russian	side,	the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast.	The	programme’s	main	objective	is	to	promote	cross-border	
cooperation	in	the	social,	environmental,	economic	and	institutional	spheres.	
The	programme	sets	out	four	priorities:	cooperation	on	the	conservation	and	
cross-border	development	of	historical,	natural	 and	cultural	heritage;	 coop-
eration	 on	 a	 clean	 environment	 in	 the	 cross-border	 area;	 accessible	 regions	
and	sustainable	cross-border	transport	and	communication;	 joint	actions	on	
efficiency	and	safety	at	borders.	In	January	2019,	a	meeting	of	the	programme’s	
Joint	Monitoring	Committee	took	place	in	Svetlogorsk.	The	main	objective	was	
to	approve	the	projects	submitted	under	the	first	call	for	proposals	for	the	the-
matic	 objective	 “Heritage”	 (cultural	 and	 tourism	 cooperation,	 protection	 of	
heritage).
In	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	it	is	possible	to	learn	the	Polish	language	on	an	op-
tional	basis	(in	a	total	of	ten	institutions	within	the	general	educational	sys-
tem,	half	of	which	are	in	the	city	of	Kaliningrad),	with	Polish	being	taught	also	
by	Polish	diaspora	organisations.	The	Faculty	of	Philology	and	Journalism	of	
the	Immanuel	Kant	University	in	Kaliningrad	offers	a	course	of	Polish	philol-
ogy	in	cooperation	with	the	Consulate	of	the	Republic	of	Poland,	thus	playing	
an	important	role	in	the	promotion	of	the	Polish	language	and	culture.	
As	 far	 as	 the Kaliningrad Oblast’s co-operation with Lithuania	 is	 con-
cerned,	a	similar	Cross-Border	Co-operation	programme	for	 the	years	2014–
2020	exists.	Its	priorities	include	co-operation	in	the	fields	of	culture,	the	pro-
tection	of	heritage,	people-to-people	contacts,	border	security,	transport	and	
ecology.	 In	2018	both	sides	agreed	to	strengthen	cooperation	on	 joint	tourist	
projects	and	routes.
The	negative	perception	of	Lithuania	is	notable	in	the	narratives	of	the	Russian	
‘patriotic’	 communities	 in	 the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	 (even	 if	 this	perception	 is	
not	as	strong	as	that	of	‘Germanisation’).	Lithuania	has	been	accused	of	incit-
ing	separatist	tendencies	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	The	Lithuanian	side	has	
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regularly	complained	about	the	problems	it	faces	when	undertaking	efforts	to	
uphold	the	culture	and	identity	of	the	Lithuanian	national	minority	in	the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast.	For	example,	Vilnius	has	for	years	been	making	unsuccessful	
efforts	to	get	a	full-fledged	Lithuanian	school	established	in	the	oblast.	While	
it	 is	possible	to	 learn	Lithuanian	in	public	schools	 in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	
on	an	optional	basis,	 teachers	of	 the	 language	from	Lithuania	face	problems	
obtaining	visas	or	work	permits.	The	authorities	are	also	reluctant	to	accept	di-
rect	contacts	between	school	head	teachers	and	Lithuania.	At	the	Kant	Univer-
sity,	Lithuanian	can	only	be	studied	as	part	of	the	Polish	philology	curriculum.	
2. cross-border travel 
The residents of the Kaliningrad Oblast are more mobile than the aver-
age Russian citizen. The	percentage	of	Kaliningrad	 residents	holding	pass-
ports,	according	to	various	data,	has	been	estimated	at	60–70%	in	recent	years	
(28%	on	average	in	Russia	as	a	whole).44	It	is	connected	with	frequent	travel	to	
European	Union	countries,	especially	to	neighbouring	Poland	and	Lithuania,	
which	attract	visitors	with	lower	prices	and	higher	quality	of	food	and	indus-
trial	goods,	as	well	as	medical	and	tourist	services.	Another	reason	is	that	Ka-
liningrad	residents	are	required	to	hold	a	passport	to	travel	to	other	regions	of	
Russia	when	travelling	by	land	through	Lithuania.
However,	the	intensity	of	trips	to	Poland	and	Lithuania,	and	the	value	of	pur-
chases	made	in	these	countries	by	the	region’s	inhabitants,	has	decreased	since	
2014.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	annexation	of	Crimea	and	the	Western	sanctions	
introduced	against	Russia,	the value of the rouble decreased significantly,	
which	in	turn	reduced	the	purchasing	power	of	Kaliningrad	residents	and	the	
attractiveness	of	shopping	in	EU	countries.	Two	years	later	(2016)	Poland	de-
cided	to	suspend the local border traffic regime which	had	enabled	easier	
and	cost-free	crossing	of	the	border	with	Poland	–	a	decision	that	may	have	also	
contributed	to	the	decrease	in	the	number	of	visitors	from	Kaliningrad.
In	2015,	 in	 the	 last	 year	 of	when	 the	 local	 border	 traffic	 regime	was	 still	 in	
place,	 the	number	 of	 crossings	 of	 the	Polish	 border	 by	 foreigners	 travelling	
44	 ‘Доля	имеющих	загранпаспорта	россиян	осталась	на	уровне	28%’, Interfax,	26.04.2016.	
After	the	annexation	of	the	Crimea,	which	resulted	in	the	devaluation	of	the	rouble	and	
an	increase	in	anti-Western	sentiment,	the	number	of	passports	issued	both	in	Russia	and	
in	the	Kaliningrad	region	decreased,	see:	‘Количество	выданных	загранпаспортов	в	
Калининградской	области	сократилось	вдвое’,	RuGrad.EU,	7.03.2016.
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from	Kaliningrad	(the	absolute	majority	of	whom	were	residents	of	the	region	
and	Russian	citizens)	amounted	to	2.7	million.	 In	2017,	2.5	million	crossings	
were	recorded,	and	in	2018	–	2.3	million.	An	even	deeper	(and	deepening	by	the	
year)	decrease	could	be	observed	 in	the	number	of	Polish	citizens	travelling	
to	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	The	number	of	border	crossings	by	Polish	citizens	
decreased	from	3.3	million	in	2015	to	2	million	in	2016,	1.4	million	in	2017	and	
1.3	million	in	2018.45	The	downward	trend	could	not	be	stopped	even	by	the	or-
ganisation	of	four	World	Cup	matches	in	Kaliningrad	in	2018.	
Currently,	Kaliningrad	residents	travel	to	Poland	with	Schengen	visas,	mostly	
multiple-entry	visas	 (in	2018	multiple-entry	visas	–	usually	valid	 for	one	or	
two	years	–	accounted	for	almost	89%	of	all	visas	issued	by	the	Consulate	Gen-
eral	of	the	Republic	of	Poland	in	Kaliningrad).	As	with	the	number	of	border	
crossings,	the	number	of	visas	issued	by	the	Consulate	General	to	the	oblast’s	
residents	has	been	decreasing.	In	2017,	it	issued	87,459	visas	(including	85,447	
Schengen	visas	and	2,012	national	visas),	and	in	2018	this	number	decreased	to	
82,211	(including	79,895	Schengen	visas	and	2316	national	visas).	
The	Consulate	General	of	Lithuania	issued	27,730	visas	to	residents	of	the	re-
gion	in	2017	and	25,265	visas	in	2018	(most	of	which	were	multiple-entry	and	
long-stay	visas).
After	the	devaluation	of	 the	rouble	 in	2014,	 there	was	a	decrease	 in	value	of	
foreigners’	 purchases	 declared	 on	 the	 Polish-Russian	 land	 border	 in	 Poland	
(which	started	to	rise	again	only	in	2017	as	the	rouble	stabilised).	In	the	case	
of	Polish	citizens,	 the	suspension	of	 the	 local	border	traffic	regime	has	been	
the	decisive	factor	 that	contributed	to	 the	decrease	 in	the	number	of	border	
crossings	and	the	value	of	purchases	in	the	Kaliningrad	region	–	since	then,	
there	has	been	a	significant	decrease	in	visits	and	spending,	which	has	been	
increasing	year	on	year.46
45	 Statistics	by	the	Border	Guard.
46	 Statistics	Poland,	Ruch graniczny oraz wydatki cudzoziemców w Polsce i Polaków za granicą w III 
kwartale 2017 roku.
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Table 1. Border traffic and spending by Kaliningrad residents in Poland and 
by Polish nationals in Russia 
border crossings (thousands) Spending (PlN millions)
Foreigners Poles Foreigners Poles
2014 3,355 3,357 866 496
2015 2,800 3,300 581 442
2016
3,300 2,000 481 283
2017 2,600 1,400 568 224
2018 2,800 1,600 552 205
In	addition,	on	1	January	2019,	Russian	legislation	came	into	force	which	limits	
the	amount	of	goods	imported	free	of	duty	(so-called	personal	luggage)	from	50	
to	25	kg	per	person	(30%	of	the	value	is	charged	for	„excess	baggage”),	which	
may	further	reduce	the	scale	of	purchases	by	Kaliningrad	citizens	in	the	neigh-
bouring	EU	countries.
The	introduction in July 2019	of free electronic visas	for	visits	to	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	might	become	an	incentive	for	foreigners	to	visit	the	region.	Those	
visas	are	valid	for	eight	days	and	issued	directly	at	the	border	on	the	basis	of	an	
electronic	application	filed	at	least	four	days	earlier.	The	visa	facilitations	are	
available	to	citizens	of	53	countries,	including	Poland	and	Lithuania.47
3. economic relations
The Kaliningrad region is among the top ten Russian regions with the 
most intensive foreign trade relations.	After	the	collapse	of	trade	in	2015,	
mainly	due	to	the	devaluation	of	the	Russian	rouble	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	the	
47	 ‘Власти	опубликовали	список	стран,	граждане	которых	смогут	ездить	в	Калининград	
по	бесплатной	визе’,	27.06.2019.	Since	August	2017,	electronic	visas	have	been	issued	to	cit-
izens	of	eighteen	countries	(including	China)	at	the	entrance	to	the	Primorsky	Krai	in	the	
Far	East	of	Russia.	During	the	first	year	of	its	operation,	over	22,000	people	benefited	from	
this	solution.
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introduction	of	Western	sanctions	and	Russian	counter-sanctions,	trade	rela-
tions	have	been	recovering	in	the	last	two	years.	In	2018,	Kaliningrad’s	exports	
increased	to	the	equivalent	of	US$	2	billion,	i.e.	by	over	50%,	and	imports	to	
US$	8.3	billion,	i.e.	by	15%.	However,	a	large	negative	trade	balance	remains.	
Chart 6. Kaliningrad Oblast’s trade exchange
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Agricultural products and foods are the Kaliningrad Oblast’s main ex-
port commodity, accounting	for	around	65%	of	total	exports. However,	this	
category	of	exports	has	been	monopolised	by	a	single	company,	Sodruzhestvo	
Holding,	which	accounts	 for	90%	of	 the	region’s	 total	agricultural	and	 foods	
exports.48	This	vertically	integrated	company	dealing	in	the	farming	and	pro-
cessing	of	oilseeds	as	well	as	trade	and	logistics	is	registered	in	Luxembourg	
and	owned	by	Alexander	and	Natalia	Lutsenko.49	Thanks	 to	 the	activities	of	
Sodruzhestvo,	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	accounts	for	around	5%	of	Russia’s	total	
exports	of	agricultural	and	food	products.	Kaliningrad’s	exports	in	2018	went	
mainly	to	Norway,	the	Netherlands	and	China.
48	 See:	‘Калининградская	область	увеличила	экспорт	сельхозпродукции	до $1,3 млрд’,	
TASS,	14.02.2019.	
49	 Lutsenko	is	a	Belarusian	by	origin,	born	in	East	Germany.	In	1994	he	left	his	military	ca-
reer	for	business.	In	2014,	he	commenced	construction	of	the	Sodruzhestvo-Soya	oilseed	
processing	plant	in	the	Kaliningrad	region,	which	initially	processed	soya	imported	from	
Brazil.	In	2018,	Forbes	estimated	his	assets	at	US$	0.7	billion.	The	Lutsenkos	(husband	and	
wife)	own	90%	of	the	holding	company,	the	remaining	10%	is	owned	by	the	Japanese	trad-
er	Mitsui	&	Co.
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Chart 7. Exports from the Kaliningrad Oblast: the most important destination 
countries
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Kaliningrad’s	neighbours	–	Poland	and	Lithuania	–	remain	important	import-
ers	of	Kaliningrad	produce,	but	despite	a	gradual	increase	in	purchases	in	the	
last	two	years,	the	volume	of	their	imports	is	still	much	lower	than	before	the	
crisis.	In	2018,	Poland	purchased	commodities	worth	US$	101	million	from	the	
Kaliningrad	Oblast,	making	it	one	of	Kaliningrad’s	 ten	 largest	 importers.	At	
US$	 64	million,	 Lithuania’s	 purchases	were	much	 lower;	 the	 country	 ranks	
just	outside	the	top	ten	importers.	
Chart 8. Exports from the Kaliningrad Oblast to neighbouring countries
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Chart 9. Imports to the Kaliningrad Oblast from neighbouring countries
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Imports to Kaliningrad have also been growing rapidly in the last two 
years.	Most	of	the	goods	imported	to	the	region	belonged	to	one	category:	ma-
chinery,	equipment	and	means	of	transport;	with	car	parts	and	subassemblies	
made	in	South	Korea,	Germany,	Slovakia	and	the	Czech	Republic	for	Avtotor	
accounting	for	much	of	the	total.	Agricultural	products	and	foods	still	account-
ed	for	a	quarter	of	total	imports	to	the	oblast.	On	the	one	hand	this	shows	the	
limited	effectiveness	of	the	regional	authorities’	efforts	to	ensure	the	self-suf-
ficiency	of	the	region	in	terms	of	foodstuffs,	and	on	the	other	hand	is	the	result	
of	Sodruzhestvo	importing	a	significant	amount	of	cereals	for	further	process-
ing	at	its	plants	(e.g.	from	Brazil	or	Paraguay).
In	2018,	the	largest	volumes	of	goods	were	imported	to	the	oblast	from	Korea,	
China	and	Germany.	Poland	and	Lithuania	were	also	in	the	top	ten	most	im-
portant	 countries	 of	 origin.	However,	 their	 exports	 in	US$	 terms	 remained	
relatively	stable	 in	 the	 last	 three	years	and	 in	2018	were	worth	ca.	US$	390	
million	in	the	case	of	Poland	and	almost	US$	114	million	in	the	case	of	Lithuania	
(see	Chart	9).	
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Chart 10. Imports to the Kaliningrad Oblast: the most important countries 
of origin
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As	far	as	the	export	of	services	from	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	concerned,	the	
transport	sector	plays	a	dominant	role:	it	accounted	for	around	92%	of	the	to-
tal	volume	of	services	exports	(i.e.	US$	157	million)	in	the	first	half	of	2018.	It	
should	be	noted	that	for	now	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	not	able	to	fully	utilise	
its	potential,	as	a	result	of	which	transit	via	third	countries	is	necessary.
Lithuania’s approach is of particular importance for the Kaliningrad 
transport sector.	Lithuania’s	transit	tariffs	and	policies	are	the	decisive	fac-
tors	influencing	the	efficiency	of	the	most	intensively	used	connection	between	
Kaliningrad	and	Russia,	which	is	the	land	rail	route.	The	need	to	cross	two	state	
borders	and	use	the	services	of	foreign	carriers	significantly	increases	the	cost	
of	this	mode	of	transport	(it	is	much	more	expensive,	even	by	as	much	as	40%,	
than	transport	within	Russia).	Therefore,	the	level	of	transit	tariffs	set	in	par-
ticular	by	the	Lithuanian	carrier	is	crucial.	Russian	Railways	have	sought	to	
strengthen	their	bargaining	position	by	developing	an	alternative	to	transit,	
i.e.	the	ferry	route	(see	Chapter	II.2.3).	However,	maritime	transport	is	more	
expensive	and	slower	than	moving	goods	overland.50	Experience	so	far	shows	
that	Lithuanian	Railways	have	tended	to	increase	their	tariffs	when	the	Ka-
liningrad	ferries	were	out	of	order,	and	when	all	the	ferries	were	operational,	
they	would	lower	the	tariffs,	making	the	ferry	option	uncompetitive.
50	 According	to	estimates	made	in	Kaliningrad,	in	the	first	quarter	of	2018	the	transport	of	
a	coal	carriage	from	the	oblast	to	Russia	by	ferry	was	more	than	20%	more	expensive	than	
by	land.	Cf.	В.	Хлебников,	‘Денег	нет:	как	Москва	перестала	компенсировать	Кали-
нинграду	его	оторванность’,	Новый Калининград,	23.03.2018.
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Nevertheless, the importance of Kaliningrad’s co-operation with Lithu-
ania and Poland in the rail sector has been growing for the last two years 
because of Russia’s plans to make the Kaliningrad Oblast a transport hub 
for Asia–Europe–Asia freight.	The	success	of	this	plan	hinges	on	the	readiness	
on	the	part	of	Kaliningrad’s	neighbours	to	become	more	open	to	rail	transit.	
Freight connections between the Kaliningrad Oblast and mainland 
russia
Around half of the transport services provided by the region concern the 
transport of goods between the region and mainland Russia. The volume 
of intra-Russian transport in 2017 was about 6 million tonnes (3.5 million 
tonnes of imports and 2.5 million tonnes of exports).51 The land rail links 
(accounting for approximately 4.5–5 million tons per year) are the main 
freight transport routes providing supplies to the Kaliningrad region. 
There are currently two routes connecting the Kaliningrad Oblast 
with the rest of russia: 
•	 the northern route	–	via	Lithuania,	Latvia	and	on	to	Russia
•	 the southern route – via	Lithuania	and	Belarus;	the	trains	enter	Russia	
on	its	border	with	Belarus.	
Thanks to the broad gauge track network in Lithuania and Latvia, Russian 
trains do not have to waste time reloading their goods. However, the neces-
sity to cross two borders and use the services of carriers from the other 
countries makes the cost of transporting goods by rail from/to the oblast 
through the territory of Lithuania and Belarus about 40% more expensive 
than transporting goods over the same distance within Russia.
The direct delivery of goods to the Kaliningrad region from Russia (without 
going through transit countries) is possible via the baltiysk–ust-luga sea 
ferry connection (which is also served by train ferries). Currently, this 
connection is served by two ferries built back in the 1980s, which transport 
more than 1 million tonnes of goods per year. 
51	 Kaliningrad	Railway,	part	of	the	state-owned	Russian	Railways;	cf.	Калининградская	
железная	дорога.
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The Avtotor plant located in the Kaliningrad Oblast is the key customer of 
the Kaliningrad transport sector. In 2017 the company accounted for 69% 
of container transhipments at the port of Kaliningrad and 65% at the port 
in Baltiysk, as well 36% of all freight transport by the Kaliningrad Railway. 
The cars manufactured by Avtotor are delivered to the Russian market 
mainly by trains, also using the Baltiysk–Ust-Luga train ferry.
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Iv.  SecurITy ANd deFeNce SITuATION 
ANd POlIcy IN The KAlININGrAd OblAST
1. Situation within the security institutions and their activities 
Because	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	strategic	location	in	the	Baltic	Sea	region	
and	the	presence	of	a	contingent	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federation,	
the	institutions	responsible	for	internal	security,	including	in	the	intelligence	
aspect,	are	particularly	active	in	the	oblast.	The structures of the Federal Se-
curity Service (FSB) and the Federal Protective Service (FPS), which are 
responsible for counter-espionage protection and governmental special 
communications, play a special role there.	Due	to	the	significant	activity	of	
military	units	stationed	in	the	area,	the activity of FSB military counterin-
telligence has been increasing. Kaliningrad also remains a base for intel-
ligence operations in Lithuania and Poland. 
The	creation	in	April	2016	of	the	National Guard of the Russian Federation	
(Rosgvardia)	initiated	the	process	of	reorganising	the	units	previously	com-
prised	 in	 the	 Internal	Troops	 and	 special	units	 of	 the	 Interior	Ministry,	 in-
cluding	 the	 special	National	 Guard	motorised	 regiment	 (unit	No.	 2659)	 and	
the	OMON	units.	These	structures,	apart	from	fulfilling	the	current	security	
and	protective	tasks,	are	increasingly	being	involved	in	the	tasks	of	the	Armed	
Forces.	During	their	training	process,	particular	attention	is	paid	to	counter-
ing	sabotage	troops	and	protecting	the	Armed	Forces’	back-up	facilities.	
Since 2016, a number of reshuffles have taken place in the top leader-
ship of the power and defence ministries’ regional directorates.	Their	
characteristic	feature	has	been	that	posts	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	were	as-
signed	to	officers	who	had	no	previous	links	with	the	region	and	no	contacts	
with	representatives	of	 the	 local	political	and	business	elite.	This	 indicates	
that	their main task was to make personnel changes in subordinate in-
stitutions and to take over control of existing corruption schemes from 
local entrepreneurs, enforcement institutions and the army.	In	2016,	the	
command	 of	 the	Baltic	 Fleet	was	 dismissed	 for	 falsifying	financial	 report-
ing,	among	others	charges.	In	November	2018,	a	criminal	case	was	initiated	
against	the	former	FSB	border	guard	colonel	Sergei	Radzivilyuk	who	had	de-
veloped	illegal	financial	activities	after	retiring,	embezzled	around	5	billion	
roubles	from	the	accounts	of	controlled	companies	and	fled	to	Latvia	after	his	
activities	were	discovered.
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Map 5. Main units of the Russian Armed Forces in the Kaliningrad Oblast 
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In December 2016, Major General Igor Illarionov became the Head of the 
Interior Ministry’s regional directorate in Kaliningrad.	It	should	be	noted	
that	prior	to	his	arrival	in	the	oblast,	he	served	as	Deputy	Chief	of	Interior	Min-
istry’s	Directorate	for	Internal	Security,	which	included	him	being	responsible	
for	secret	monitoring	of	the	ministry’s	officers.	The	fact	that	Illarionov	was	sent	
to	Kaliningrad,	which	may	seem	to	be	a	form	of	downgrading,	indicates	that	
the	leadership	of	the	Interior	Ministry	assigned	him	special	tasks,	including	
those	related	to	changing	the	formula	of	relations	with	the	local	elite,	which	
previously	had	significant	influence	on	the	shape	of	informal	contacts	with	the	
local	office	of	the	Interior	Ministry.	
The	 reshuffles	 in	 the	FSB regional directorate in Kaliningrad	were	 simi-
lar	 in	nature.	 In	2016,	when	 its	 then	head,	Yevgeny	Zinichev	 (now	Minister	
for	Emergency	Situations),	was	promoted	to	acting	governor,	he	was	replaced	
as	the	FSB	chief	in	Kaliningrad	by	Major	General	Leonid	Mikhailyuk,	trans-
ferred	 from	Vologda.	 In	 the	autumn	of	2018,	after	Mikhailyuk	 took	office	 in	
occupied	Crimea,	Valery	Belitsky,	 the	 former	head	of	 the	FSB	directorate	 in	
Kemerovo	region,	became	the	FSB’s	regional	chief	in	Kaliningrad.	This	string	
of	reshuffles	in	Kaliningrad’s	FSB	is	a	strong	indication	that	the	leadership of 
the service considers the Kaliningrad Oblast to be a region needing spe-
cial observation.	By	periodically	replacing	the	regional	chiefs,	the	FSB	seeks	
to	more	effectively	moderate	the	internal,	secret	power	relations	and	prevent	
a	loosening	of	the	headquarters’	control	of	the	situation	in	the	region.
In January 2018 Colonel Alexander Nesterenko, who	 had	 worked	 in	 the	
structures	of	the	Interior	Ministry	in	St.	Petersburg	since	1993,	was	appointed	
as	head	of	the	National	Guard	regional	directorate.	Previously,	he	had	served	
for	ten	years	as	chief	of	the	Interior	Ministry/Rosgvardia’s	Extradepartmental	
Security	Service	in	St.	Petersburg	(dealing	with	the	provision	of	paid	security	
services	 to	public	administration	 institutions,	museums,	courts,	etc.).	Major	
General	Oleg	Gorshkov,	Nesterenko’s	predecessor	in	the	Kaliningrad	region-
al	directorate	of	Rosgvardia	(who	served	between	October	2016	and	 January	
2018)	currently	heads	a	similar	body	in	the	Moscow	Oblast.	
The	law	enforcement	agencies	attach	great	importance	to	tasks	related	to	com-
bating	‘political	extremism’	–	a	concept	that	encompasses	a	broad	range	of	ac-
tivities	 interpreted	as	 threatening	 the	stability	of	 the	system	of	power.	 It is 
also a unique feature of the Kaliningrad branches of the institutions of 
force that their work is heavily focused on counteracting activities in-
terpreted by the authorities as aimed at weakening the region’s relations 
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with Russia.	They	have	 succeeded	 in	 suppressing	 the	 activity	 of	 communi-
ties	advocating	cooperation	with	Germany	in	various	areas,	a	clear	example	
of	which	was	the	closure	of	the	German-Russian	House	in	January	2017.	The	
FSB	 and	 the	 Interior	Ministry	monitor	people	with	 radical	 views	 and	 those	
critical	of	the	authorities.	The	activities	of	the	services	are	continuous	and	re-
veal	an	elaborate	system	of	surveillance.	In	December	2018,	it	was	announced	
that	a	resident	of	the	region	who,	according	to	law	enforcement	agencies	was	
a	supporter	of	nationalist	ideology	and	had	established	contacts	with	radical	
Ukrainian	 organisations,	 had	 been	 sentenced	 to	 eight	 years’	 imprisonment.	
According	to	the	indictment,	he	had	been	under	surveillance	since	2015,	be-
cause	of	his	activities	that	were	extremist	 in	nature	and	involved	the	inten-
tion	 to	 take	up	 service	 in	an	 illegal	military	 formation.	The activity of the 
FSB counter-espionage service has also increased visibly. In	the	summer	of	
2018,	the	Russian	media	publicised	the	case	of	Antonina	Zimina,	detained	on	
charges	of	being	a	spy	for	Western	intelligence	services.	Zimina	was	the	head	
of	the	Baltic	Centre	for	Cultural	Dialogue	in	Kaliningrad	and	cooperated	with	
the	pro-Kremlin	Gorchakov	Public	Diplomacy	Fund.	Considering	that	in	2015	
she	was	expelled	 from	Lithuania	where	 she	participated	 in	a	 conference	on	
international	politics,	it	is	possible	that	she	had	been	cooperating	with	the	Rus-
sian	secret	services.	The	local	FSB	also	publicises	cases	of	persons	who	are	de-
tained	on	charges	of	being	involved	in	military	intelligence	activities,	under-
lining	the	preventive	nature	of	its	measures.	In	October	2017,	it	was	announced	
that	a	warning	conversation	had	been	held	with	a	Kaliningrad	resident	who	
intended	to	provide	classified	information	on	the	security	status	of	the	region	
to	one	of	the	foreign	intelligence	services.
The Kaliningrad region continues to serve as a base for Russian intelligence 
activities.	This	is	confirmed	by	successive	reports	by	the	Lithuanian	security	
services52	which	note	the	negative	consequences	of	the	progressing	militarisation	
of	the	oblast,	considered	by	Russia	as	an	outpost	to	counteract	NATO’s	defence	
capability	build-up.	Apart	from	military	issues,	the	Russian	intelligence	services	
are	also	interested	in	influencing	the	views	of	the	political	elites	in	neighbour-
ing	countries.	According	to	the	Lithuanian	secret	services,	Russian	intelligence	
services	are	involved	in	inciting	activities	aimed	at	encouraging	representatives	
of	Lithuania’s	political	and	economic	elites	to	promote	solutions	that	facilitate	
business	contacts	(including	the	facilitation	of	border	traffic)	and	to	promote	the	
view	that	it	is	necessary	to	conduct	a	‘pragmatic’	policy	towards	Russia.	In their 
52	 See:	National	Threat	Assessments,	Vilnius	2018.	
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intelligence activities, officers of the Russian secret services in the Kalin-
ingrad region use the support of the Belarusian services. In	early	July	2017,	
a	Lithuanian	court	sentenced	Lieutenant	Colonel	Nikolai	Filipchenko	of	the	FSB	
to	ten	years’	imprisonment	for	conducting	intelligence	activities	and	attempting	
to	recruit	officers	from	the	Lithuanian	secret	services	responsible	for	the	secu-
rity	of	government	facilities.
2. Military situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast
In 2017–2018 Russia stepped up the modernisation and expansion of military 
capabilities in the Kaliningrad region, contributing to a visible increase in 
the offensive capabilities of the Russian armed forces deployed there.	
2.1. Expansion of infrastructure
The	Kaliningrad	Oblast	is	one	of	the	few	regions	in	Russia	whose	military	infra-
structure	has	not	been	modernised	and	developed	in	any	real	sense	since	Soviet	
times.	Expanded	in	the	1990s	to	host	a	contingent	of	more	than	100,000	troops	at	
the	peak	(when	units	withdrawn	from	the	Soviet	Union’s	former	satellite	coun-
tries	were	relocated	to	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast),	this	infrastructure	was	consid-
ered	sufficient	for	the	needs	of	the	armed	units	deployed	there	–	downsized	to	
25,000	troops	at	the	beginning	of	the	2000s	–	and	was	capable	of	accommodating	
potential	reinforcements	if	necessary.	As the infrastructure modernisation 
process started, it was associated with the progressive professionalisation 
of troops (and therefore higher requirements from soldiers as to the condi-
tions of service) and, most importantly, with a gradual shift towards new 
types of weapons and military equipment.	In	2017–2018,	new facilities	for	
the	Iskander	missile	systems	were	prepared,	with	which	the	152nd	Missile	Bri-
gade	(Chernyakhovsk)	was	equipped,	as	well	as	for	the	Bal	and	Bastion	systems,	
which	were	provided	to	the	25th	Coastal	Missile	Regiment	(Donskoye).	Moderni-
sation	efforts	were	also	undertaken	with	regard	to	the	existing	infrastructure	
for	 general	military	units	 (e.g.	 for	 the	newly	 formed	 11th	Tank	Regiment,	 dis-
cussed	in	more	detail	below),	as	well	as	for	the	support	and	logistic	backup	fa-
cilities.	Particularly	notable	is	the	reconstruction of the ammunition storage 
facility (including nuclear weapons), whose reconstruction was completed 
in mid-201953.	Satellite	images	(made	available	by	the	US)	suggest	that	the	facil-
ity,	located	in	Kulikovo	near	Kaliningrad,	has	been	largely	reconstructed.
53	 Interfax,	TASS,	17.07.2019.
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The	airfield	network	has	undergone	the	most	significant	changes	so	far.	In Oc-
tober 2018, the modernised and expanded Chkalovsk airfield was finally 
put into operation after	work	commenced	in	2012	were	completed.	It is now 
one of the largest military airfields in Russia,	capable	of	handling	virtually	
all	 categories	of	 aircraft,	 including	heavy	 transport	planes.	The	runway	has	
been	extended	from	2,600	m	to	3,100	m	and	widened	to	allow	the	simultane-
ous	take-off	of	several	aircraft,	and	the	number	of	hangars	and	parking	posi-
tions	has	been	significantly	increased.	The	current	deployment	in	Chkalovsk	
of	two	fighter	aviation	regiments	recreated	in	recent	years	(see	below	for	more	
information)	is	presumably	not	the	target	solution	and	should	be	analysed	in	
the	context	of	the	reconstruction of the Chernyakhovsk	airfield,	where	all	
fighter	aircraft	of	 the	 then	72nd	Air	Base	were	stationed	until	 the	autumn	of	
2018	in	connection	with	the	work	on	the	Chkalovsk	airfield.	The	expansion	of	
the	airfield	infrastructure	should	therefore	be	seen	not	only	in	the	context	of	
the	aforementioned	restoration	of	the	two	fighter	aviation	regiments,	but	also	
as	a	basis	for	the	possible	transfer	of	reinforcements	in	the	form	of	two	more	
fighter	aviation	regiments	to	the	Kaliningrad	region	(assuming	that	the	scale	
of	the	Chernyakhovsk	airfield	upgrade	will	be	similar).
2.2. Expansion of the armed forces group 
In	2018	the	Kaliningrad	contingent	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federa-
tion	started to expand its air and land units, focusing first of all on the 
formation of offensive units – for	the	first	time	after	decades	of	cuts	followed	
by	 stagnation.	Two fighter aviation regiments were reactivated (part	 of	
the	72nd	Air	Base,	since	May	2019	the	132nd	Mixed	Aviation	Division),	as	well	
as	a tank regiment (directly	subordinated	to	the	command	of	the	11th	Army	
Corps).	The	aviation	units	were	recreated	on	the	basis	of	existing	squadrons	
and	expanded,	while	the	tank	unit	was	created	from	scratch	based	on	person-
nel	and	equipment	transferred	from	outside	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.
The restoration of the 4th Separate Naval Attack Aviation Regiment (sta-
tioned	in	Chkalovsk,	before	October	2018	in	Chernyakhovsk)	started	in	2017	
when	the	unit	received	its	first	deliveries	of	new	Su-30	multirole	combat	air-
craft	(see	below	for	more	 information).	The	4th	Regiment	was	created	on	the	
basis	of	the	attack	aviation	squadron	of	the	former	72nd	Air	Base,	which	was	
equipped	with	older	attack	and	 tactical	 reconnaissance	aircraft	Su-24M/Su-
24MR.	 In	 the	 autumn	 of	 2018,	 the	 unit	 reached	 combat	 readiness	with	 two	
squadrons	 (Su-24	 and	 Su-30).	The re-establishment of the 689th Fighter 
Aviation Regiment commenced	in	2018	as	the	Chkalovsk	airfield	expansion	
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was	nearing	completion.	The	689th	Regiment	was	 formed	on	 the	basis	of	 the	
fighter	squadron	of	the	former	72nd	Air	Base.	Unlike	the	4th	Naval	Attack	Avia-
tion	Regiment,	it	is	equipped	solely	with	aircraft	of	the	Su-27	family.	As a con-
sequence of the re-creation of the two aviation regiments, the staff and 
command structures of the entire aviation contingent in the Kalinin-
grad Oblast were expanded and the 72nd Air Base was transformed into 
the 132nd Mixed Aviation Division. In addition to the regiments named 
above, in the 132nd Division a helicopter regiment is being formed. 
In	January	2019,	the	Russian	Defence	Ministry	confirmed	that	the	11th Inde-
pendent Tank Regiment (Gusev) had been formed	as	part	of	the	11th	Army	
Corps,54	equipped	with	upgraded	T-72B	tanks.	The	unit	was	created	by	trans-
forming	 the	 independent	 tank	battalion	 created	 in	 July	2018.	Upgrading	 it	
to	 regiment	 status	 involved	 the	 creation	of	 a	 second	battalion,	 and	a	 third	
tank	battalion	and	other	units	of	the	regiment	are	expected	to	be	completed	
in	2019.	The	11th	Tank	Regiment	is	the	first	general	military	unit	of	this	level	
to	be	established	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	since	the	fall	of	the	Soviet	Union.	
The	formation	of	a	 tank	regiment	 in	the	oblast	should	be	seen	as	the first, 
most difficult step towards recreating a mechanised division in the ex-
clave,	because	the	armoured	troops	units	previously	stationed	in	region	had	
been	almost	completely	disbanded.55	Before	July	2018,	the	tank	battalion	of	
the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade	(Gusev)	was	the	only	armoured	unit	in	the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast.
The	plans	for	2019	include	establishing an additional (third) missile divi-
sion (in Donskoye) as part of the 25th Coastal Missile Regiment,	equipped	
with	 the	 Bal	 systems.	When	 that	 happens,	 the	 regiment	will	 comprise	 two	
divisions	 equipped	with	 the	 Bal	 systems	 and	 one	 division	with	 the	 Bastion	
54	 Bearing	in	mind	the	Russian	pragmatic	approach	in	which	new	units	start	functioning	at	
the	onset	of	a	new	training	period	in	the	Russian	Armed	Forces	(1	December	or	1	June),	it	
should	be	assumed	that	the	11th	Tank	Regiment	and	the	689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	
were	officially	incorporated	into	the	structures	of	the	Russian	Armed	Forces	on	1	December	
2018,	while	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	Regiment	was	probably	incorporated	six	
months	earlier.
55	 The	remaining	general	military	and	support	regiments	of	the	1st	Guards	Mechanised	Division	
disbanded	in	2002	have	not	been	liquidated:	one	of	them	continues	as	a	full-fledged	unit	(cur-
rently	named	the	7th	Mechanised	Regiment	in	Kaliningrad),	and	the	remaining	two	mecha-
nised	regiments	and	the	artillery	regiment	have	been	transformed	into	arms	and	military	
equipment	storage	bases.	Only	the	tank	regiment	and	tank	battalions	in	the	mechanised	reg-
iments	were	disbanded	entirely	(the	tanks	were	taken	to	mainland	Russia	and	the	tank	bat-
talion	in	the	7th	Mechanised	Regiment	continues	as	a	cadre	structure	without	weapons).	
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systems	(see	below	for	more	information).	In	addition,	it	is	possible	that,	after	
reinforcing,	it	will	be	upgraded	to	a	brigade.56
2.3. Technical modernisation
Unlike	most	formations	of	the	Western	Military	District	which	it	is	part	of,	
the	Kaliningrad	 contingent	 of	 the	Armed	Forces	 of	 the	Russian	Federation	
has	long	remained	on	the	margins	of	the	Russian	military’s	technical	mod-
ernisation	 process.	The	 only	 exceptions	 concerned	 the	 new	 equipment	 ac-
quired	by	the	Navy	(new	Baltic	Fleet	warships	and	auxiliary	units,	stationed	
in	Baltiysk,	have	been	regularly	entering	service	since	2008)	and	by	air	and	
space	defence	units.	Concerning	the	latter,	S-400	systems	were	deployed	in	
Kaliningrad	in	2013.	This	was	the	first	deployment	of	this	kind	of	missile	sys-
tems	in	the	European	part	of	the	Russian	Federation	apart	from	the	Moscow	
area.	The Kaliningrad contingent started receiving new offensive weap-
ons only in late 2016.57
The	re-arming of the 152nd Missile Brigade (Chernyakhovsk) with the Is-
kander missile systems,	completed	in	November	2017,	has	been	particularly	
important,	for	both	military	and	political	reasons.	The	missiles’	nominal	range	
(500	km)	covers	Poland	as	well	as	Estonia,	Latvia	and	Lithuania,	and	after	the	
launchers	are	equipped	with	9M729	cruise	missiles	(which	is	only	a	matter	of	
time),	the	whole	of	Europe	will	be	in	the	systems’	range.58	For	more	than	a	dec-
ade,	Russia	claimed	that	the	deployment	of	the	Iskander	systems	at	the	152nd	
Missile	Brigade	in	Kaliningrad	would	serve	as	retaliation	for	US	activities	in	
Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	and	especially	the	deployment	of	elements	of	the	
missile	defence	system	in	Poland,	rather	 than	being	simply	part	of	 the	Rus-
sian	Armed	Forces’	technical	modernisation	programme	to	2020.	Eventually,	
the	Iskanders	were	deployed	 in	the	exclave	as	originally	scheduled,	without	
any	relation	to	the	progress	of	the	development	of	the	US	base	in	Redzikowo,	
Poland,	although	it	should	be	noted	that	the	152nd	Missile	Brigade	was	the	pe-
56	 In	some	sources,	the	25th	Coastal	Missile	Regiment	has	already	featured	for	several	years	as	
the	25th	Coastal	Missile	Brigade.	However,	this	upgrade	has	not	been	confirmed	to	date	and	
the	two-division	structure	is	not	consistent	with	brigade	level.	
57	 In	the	classification	adopted	in	the	1990	Treaty	on	Conventional	Armed	Forces	in	Europe	
these	include:	tanks,	armoured	fighting	vehicles,	artillery	(including	missiles	systems)	with	
calibres	of	100	mm	and	above,	fighter	aircraft	and	combat	helicopters.
58	 Equipping	the	Iskander	systems	with	9M729	missiles	(based	on	the	Kalibr	missiles),	which	
constitutes	a	violation	of	the	INF	Treaty	(ultimately	terminated	by	the	United	States	in	Feb-
ruary	2019	by	the	United	States	and	then	by	Russia)	increases	their	range	even	to	2,600km.
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nultimate	existing	missile	brigade	in	the	Russian	Ground	Forces	to	receive	the	
Iskander	systems.59
The	provision	of	the	Bastion	systems	to	the	second	division	of	the	25th	Coastal	
Missile	Regiment	(Donskoye)	in	2017	should	also	be	considered	in	a	strategic	
perspective;	the	first	division	of	the	25th	Regiment	was	equipped	with	the	Bal	
missile	systems	in	2016.	In	2019	the	third	division,	currently	being	formed,	is	
expected	to	receive	the	systems.	The	Bal	systems,	which	in	principle	serve	to	
destroy	naval	 targets,	may	be	armed	not	only	with	the	Oniks	missiles	(with	
a	range	of	up	to	600	km),	but	also	with	the	Kalibr	missiles	(with	a	range	of	at	
least	1,500	km).60	As	the	operations	in	Syria	demonstrated,	both	types	of	mis-
siles	can	be	fired	from	the	Bastion	system	launchers	at	naval	targets	but	also	
at	 land	 targets.	 If	 the	Bastions	 are	used	 as	 intended,	 i.e.	 as	 carriers	 of	 anti-
warship	missiles,	their	deployment	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	transforms	the	
Baltic	Sea	 (or	at	 least	 its	 southern	and	middle	part)	 into	an	anti-access	zone	
(A2/AD)	which	–	in	the	event	of	an	armed	conflict	–	renders	navigation	diffi-
cult	or	impossible	and	is	comparable	to	the	zone	created	in	the	air	space	by	the	
S-400	systems.
As	part	of	the	continuing	re-arming	of	units	of	the	44th	Air	Defence	Division	
(Kaliningrad),	in	2018	the	deployment	of	the	S-400 systems	was	completed	at	
the	183rd	Anti-Aircraft	Rocket	Regiment	(Gvardeysk),	and	in	March	2019,	the	
same	systems	were	provided	to	the	first	of	the	two	squadrons	of	the	1545th	Anti-
Aircraft	Rocket	Regiment	(Znamensk)	that	are	expected	to	be	armed	with	the	
systems	this	year.	In total, by the end of 2019 the Kaliningrad Oblast will 
host six full squadrons equipped with S-400 systems (48 launchers, a to-
tal of 192 simultaneously fired missiles), putting the region in second po-
sition after the Moscow Oblast in terms of the density of the S-400 deploy-
ment.	The	 1545th	Regiment	 still	 has	 two	 squadrons	 equipped	with	 the	older	
S-300PS	systems	but,	according	to	some	sources,	they	have	been	moved	to	the	
reserve	in	anticipation	of	re-arming.61	It	should	be	noted	that	the	replacement	
59	 The	original	plan	was	to	re-arm	10	missile	brigades	with	the	Iskander	systems	by	2020.	In	
2015,	an	eleventh	brigade	was	formed,	and	in	2018,	the	formation	of	two	more	commenced.	
By	the	end	of	2018,	the	Iskander	systems	had	been	provided	to	11	brigades,	most	recently	to	
the	448th	Missile	Brigade	(Kursk).
60	 The	range	of	the	Ch-35	missiles	of	the	Bal	system	is	up	to	260	km;	they	a	capable	of	striking	
waterborne	targets	only.
61	 The	S-300PS	divisions	were	supposed	to	be	moved	to	the	1545th	Air	Defence	Missile	regiment	
from	the	183rd	Air	Defence	Missile	Regiment.	The	S-300W4	systems	(two	battalions	in	total)	
previously	held	by	the	1545th	Regiment	have	probably	been	decommissioned	altogether.	
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of	weapons	has	taken	place	in	parallel	to	an	expansion	of	the	1545th	Regiment	
which	for	many	years	comprised	only	two	missile	squadrons.
In	 December	 2016,	 Chernyakhovsk	 saw	 the	 first	 arrival	 of	new Su-30SM 
multirole combat	aircraft	 since	the	creation	of	an	air	 force	contingent	 in	
the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	In	total,	by	July	2018	the	number	of	this	kind	of	air-
craft	deployed	with	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	Regiment	had	in-
creased	to	eight,	and	deliveries	are	set	to	continue.	According	to	some	sourc-
es,	the	4th	Regiment	has	also	received	eight	older	Su-30M2 aircraft	in	order	
to	 create	 a	 full	 squadron.62	Additional	 aircraft	 from	 the	Su-27 family have	
also	been	redeployed	to	the	689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	in	the	Kalinin-
grad	Oblast	from	the	790th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	(Khotilovo	in	the	Tver	
Oblast)	 after	 the	 latter	 obtained	new	Su-35S aircraft.	However,	 it	 has	not	
been	confirmed	if	both	squadrons	have	already	reached	their	full	size.63	The	
Su-27	aircraft	of	the	689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	are	also	set	to	be	ulti-
mately	replaced	by	the	Su-35S.
The	T-72B tanks which	have	been	deployed	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	since	2018	
are	not	the	most	advanced	model	in	the	Russian	army,64	but the restoration of 
armoured units in the region should definitely be seen as the most impor-
tant factor in strengthening the offensive capabilities of the ground troops 
stationed in the exclave.	Before	July	2018,	when	the	first	elements	of	the	future	
11th	Tank	Regiment	were	formed,	the	Russian	Ground	Forces	in	the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast	had	only	41	tanks	(a	battalion	in	the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade).	When the 
formation of the 11th Tank Regiment is completed, the number of tanks in 
62	 Depending	on	the	source,	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	Regiment	has	14	to	16	ma-
chines	from	the	Su-24M	family	and	8	to	16	machines	from	the	Su-30	family	(eight	Su-30SM	
and	possibly	Su-30M2).	
63	 Depending	on	the	source,	the	newly	formed	squadron	of	the	689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	
has	13	Su-27SM3	aircraft	of	the	newest	variant	or	older	Su-27P	aircraft.	Most	probably	it	has	
both	versions	of	the	aircraft,	but	not	necessarily	of	SM3	standard	(according	to	some	sourc-
es,	the	790th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	had	only	six	Su-27SM	aircraft	and	the	squadron	tak-
en	over	from	the	72nd	Air	Base	had	9–10	single-seat	Su-27/Su-27P	aircraft	and	5	two-seat	Su-
27UP/Su-27UB	aircraft).
64	 There	is	no	information	available	on	the	upgrade	package	of	the	tanks	transferred	to	the	11th	
Tank	Regiment.	Most	probably	these	are	tanks	of	the	older	standard	of	T-72B1	(this	type	of	
tank	was	presented	in	January	2019	to	a	group	of	Spanish	inspectors),	but	it	should	be	em-
phasised	that	a	mass	upgrade	of	the	T-72B	tanks	still	held	by	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Rus-
sian	Federation	to	the	T-72B3	standard	–	with	capabilities	comparable	to	those	of	the	T-90	
tank	–	has	been	underway	for	the	last	several	years.	It	should	be	assumed	that	the	T-72B3	is	
set	to	become	the	basic	tank	model	also	for	11th	Army	Corps.
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the Kaliningrad Oblast will increase to 135.65	If	the	restoration	of	the	tank	regi-
ment	is	a	first	step	towards	recreating	a	mechanised	division	in	the	Kaliningrad	
Oblast,66	the	recreation	of	the	other	mechanised	regiments	and	the	planned	resto-
ration	of	tank	battalions	within	the	7th	Mechanised	Regiment	and	the	336th	Naval	
Infantry	Brigade	will	result	in	an increase in the total number of tanks held by 
units of the 11th Army Corps in the Kaliningrad Oblast to 300 by the begin-
ning of the next decade.67	The	number	of	armoured	fighting	vehicles	and	artil-
lery	units	will	also	increase	proportionally	(see	the	Appendix).
Compared	to	the	progress	made	in	technologically	upgrading	the	land	and	air	
units,	the	acquisitions	of	new	or	modernised	equipment	for	operations	on	the	
Baltic	 Sea	 in	 2017–2018	 almost	 seem	 insignificant	 (and	 it	 should	 be	 remem-
bered	 that	 the	entire	Kaliningrad	contingent	 is	directly	subordinated	 to	 the	
Baltic	Fleet	Command	and	is	regarded	as	the	fleet’s	air	and	land	component).	
The	only	exception	concerns	the seven modernised anti-submarine Ka-27M 
helicopters which	the	Baltic	Fleet	acquired	by	October	2018.	This	number	cor-
responds	to	a	third	of	all	the	land-based	anti-submarine	helicopters	upgraded	
so	far	for	the	Russian	Navy,	which	demonstrates that preparations to coun-
ter NATO submarines in the Baltic are treated as a priority.
The prototype Karakurt-class / project 22800 missile corvette, the Myt-
ishchi, is the only new Baltic Fleet warship deployed in Baltiysk.	 It	 en-
tered	service	in	December	2018	and	is	armed	mainly	with	Kalibr	missiles.	In 
2019, the Baltiysk contingent is expected to be reinforced with another 
vessel of this type – the Sovetsk.
65	 A	Russian	tank	regiment	(as	well	as	an	armoured	brigade)	comprises	three	tank	battalions	
(31	tanks	in	each,	including	the	command	tank,	making	94	tanks	in	total),	a	mechanised	bat-
talion	(41	infantry	fighting	vehicles)	as	well	as	support	and	backup	units.	A	tank	battalion	
in	brigades	and	mechanised	regiments	has	one	company	more	(41	tanks	in	total).
66	 Armoured	and	mechanised	regiments	do	not	function	independently	within	the	structures	
of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federation.	The	fact	that	the	‘stand-alone’	7th	mechanised	
regiment	was	maintained	(previously	expanded	to	brigade	level)	is	an	indication	that	there	
were	plans	to	reactivate	a	division	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	and	the	creation	of	the	11th	tank	
regiment	further	corroborates	that.	
67	 A	Russian	mechanised	division	comprises	three	mechanised	regiments	and	one	tank	regi-
ment.	Given	that	one	mechanised	regiment	(the	7th	mechanised	regiment)	already	exists,	it	
cannot	be	ruled	out	that	only	one	of	the	missing	regiments	would	be	restored,	and	the	oth-
er	would	be	formed	on	the	basis	of	the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade.	However,	the	operational	
characteristics	of	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	suggest	that	the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade	will	re-
main	an	independent	tactical	unit.
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Four Steregushchiy-class / project 20380 corvettes	started	service	in	the	Baltic	
Fleet	in	2008–2014	The	Neustrashimy-class / project	11540 Yastreb frigate is	
being	upgraded	and	this	is	about	to	be	completed	at	Kaliningrad’s	Yantar	shipyard.	
The	two	project 877 submarines	that	are	still	present	in	the	Baltic	and	operate	
from	Kronstadt	(expected	to	be	joined	by	a	third	vessel	of	this	type,	transferred	
from	the	Black	Sea	Fleet	to	the	Baltic	Fleet	and	currently	undergoing	modernisa-
tion).	It	has	been	decided	that	all	of	these	should all be adapted to be capable of 
launching Kalibr missiles. This	further	confirms	that	the	aim	is	to	transform	the	
Baltic	Fleet	naval	contingent	into	one	supporting	land	and	air	operations.68
2.4. Training activities
The	Kaliningrad	contingent	of	the	Armed	Forces	of	the	Russian	Federation	has	
been	one	of	the	most	actively	involved	in	various	training	activities	for	many	
years.	Since mid-2017 at the latest, i.e. since preparations to the Zapad-2017 
strategic drill, units stationed in the exclave have significantly stepped 
up their training activity, which has remained as intensive since then.	
Irrespective	of	the	season,	drills	have	been	taking	place	in	the	Kaliningrad	fir-
ing	ranges	and	on	the	Baltic	Sea,	and	selected	units	are	 in	permanent	firing	
range	training	mode.	By	the	autumn	of	2018,	twenty-six	of	them	have	achieved	
the	status	of	so-called	strike	units	(in	permanent	readiness).69
Observation	of	the	drills	suggests	that	the	Kaliningrad	contingent	is	preparing	
for	a	regular	armed	clash	(in	the	form	of	a	combined	operation)	with	NATO’s	
air,	land	and	naval	units.	Particularly	noteworthy	are	the	first-contact	units,	
i.e.	air	defence,	combat	units	of	the	Air	Force,	missile	and	radio	engineering	
troops,	and	the	336th	Naval	Infantry	Brigade	(the	only	Russian	naval	infantry	
unit	that	includes	a	permanent	landing	and	assault	battalion	modelled	on	sim-
ilar	units	in	the	Airborne	Troops).	
68	 It	is	notable	that	the	Kalibr	missiles	are	carried	by	two	21631	Buyan-M-class	corvettes	(pre-
decessors	of	the	Karakurt-class),	which	were	redeployed	to	Baltiysk	in	2016.	The	tasks	of	pro-
ject	20380	corvettes	and	project	11540	frigates	(the	Baltic	Fleet	has	two	vessels	of	this	kind,	
being	the	only	one	in	Russian	Federation’s	Navy)	also	include	air	defence	tasks.	They	should	
therefore	been	treated	as	complementing	the	on-land	systems	and	expanding	the	anti-ac-
cess	(A2/AD)	zone	on	the	Baltic	Sea.
69	 Including	divisions	equipped	with	the	Bastion,	Iskander	and	S-400	missile	systems,	the	Ser-
pukhov	corvette	carrying	the	Kalibr	missiles,	Michman	Lermontov	and	Denis	Davydov	fast	
landing	craft,	a	squadron	of	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	Regiment	and	battalions	
of	the	79th	Mechanised	Brigade	and	the	336th	Naval	Infantry	Brigade.
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The	most	frequently	repeated	elements	of	the	drills	include:
 – countering the enemy’s means of air attack (aircraft and missiles);
 – striking targets deep behind enemy lines;
 – countering groupings of naval units;
 – detecting and countering submarines;
 – carrying out landings behind enemy lines using the combined method 
(with fast landing craft and helicopters);
 – distorting the enemy’s command and communications systems.
The training that takes place suggest that it is assumed the Kaliningrad 
contingent would carry out operations independently of the main forces 
of the Russian army in the western strategic direction (from Moscow’s 
perspective).	The	drills	include	moving	aircraft	to	alternate	airfields	and	re-
moving	warships	 from	 enemy	 impact	 area.	The	 defence	manoeuvres	 devel-
oped	by	the	11th	Army	Corps	suggest	that	the	main	task	of	this	unit	would	be	to	
engage	enemy	forces.	It	is	notable	that	the	4th	Separate	Naval	Attack	Aviation	
Regiment,	which	is	 formally	a	unit	of	 the	naval	air	 forces,	has	been	practis-
ing	attacks	on	enemy	land	units	more	often	than	operations	on	the	Baltic	Sea.	
The	September	2018	drill	which	practised	the	evacuation,	repair	and	redeploy-
ment	of	military	equipment	damaged	in	combat,	and	the	drill	on	the	evacua-
tion	of	wounded	personnel	(including	by	fast	boats	and	helicopters	from	deep	
behind	enemy	lines	and	from	the	landing	zone	to	a	warship)	indicate	that	these	
are	real	preparations	to	an	armed	confrontation.
Provocations against NATO forces, which have been occurring at least since 
2014 and which usually involve the Air Force (such	as	violations	of	airspace,	
obstruction	 of	 identification,	 dangerous	 encounters	 with	 planes	 and	 ships	
from	NATO	countries),	are	now	a	permanent	element	of	 the	contingent’s	ac-
tivities.	In	January	2019,	responding	to	the	entry	of	US	warships	into	the	Baltic,	
Russian	corvettes	armed	with	the	Bastion	systems	conducted	a	demonstrative	
drill	to	practise	the	destruction	of	enemy	units,	taking	aim	at	the	US	warships	
according	 to	 some	sources.70	 It	 is	 an	open	question	 if	 and	when	 this	kind	of	
provocation	eventually	result	in	an	incident	involving	a	real	exchange	of	fire.
70	 In	February	2018,	the	newly	deployed	Bastion	systems	in	the	Kaliningrad	region	practiced	
the	sinking	of	aircraft	carriers,	but	as	the	possibility	of	bringing	this	category	of	ships	to	the	
Baltic	Sea	is	purely	hypothetical,	these	exercises	were	purely	for	propaganda	reasons.
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cONcluSION: OuTlOOK
As	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	governance	has	been	centralised	and	consolidated	
in	the	hands	of	a	governor	whose	independence	from	Moscow	has	simultane-
ously	been	limited,	the	social and political situation	in	the	region	in	the	com-
ing	years	will	be	heavily	influenced	by	the	general	trends	in	Russia.	The	Krem-
lin’s	intention	will	invariably	be	to	maintain	full	control	of	the	region	and	to	
continue	 using	 its	 geopolitical	 position	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 its	 anti-Western	
propaganda	campaign	and	militarisation.	
The	governor	will	be	held	accountable	for	the	stability	of	the	region,	despite	his	
limited	ability	to	influence	its	main	determinants.	These	include:	the	dysfunc-
tional	economic	model	and	underfunded	social	policy,	the	investment	climate,	
activities	of	the	secret	services,	and	external	relations.	Social	discontent	or	ten-
sions	within	the	regional	elite	may	arise	as	a	result	of	falling	standards	of	liv-
ing	or	further	asset	takeovers	by	actors	associated	with	Moscow.	In	that	event,	
the	Kremlin’s	response	will	most	likely	be	to	intensify	repression	against	se-
lected	social	groups	and	the	establishment	(using	anti-corruption	campaigns	
designed	for	public	consumption,	and	repressive	 laws	adopted	at	 the	federal	
level).	As	a	last	resort,	the	region’s	leadership	may	be	replaced	ahead	of	sched-
ule,	which	will	not	affect	the	logic	of	how	the	oblast	is	managed	from	the	fed-
eral	level.	
The economic situation in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	depends	heavily	on	the	situ-
ation	in	Russia	as	a	whole.	According	to	most	forecasts,	the	Russian	economy	is	
expected	to	grow	moderately	in	the	next	few	years	(by	about	1%	of	GDP	in	2019	
and	3%	after	2020).	This	means	that	the	gross	regional	product	of	the	oblast	will	
also	increase,	although	maintaining	the	2018	growth	rate	(ca.	3.6%)	may	prove	
very	difficult.	The	factors	that	have	been	driving	the	region’s	growth	will	wear	
off.	Rising	costs	of	bank	loans	and	the	tightening	of	the	central	bank’s	 lend-
ing	conditions	for	natural	persons,	combined	with	falling	incomes,	will	have	
a	negative	impact	on	demand	and	thus	on	the	financial	results	of	Avtotor,	the	
largest	business	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast.	 It	 is	also	uncertain	if	 investment	
demand	can	be	sustained	at	the	current	level.	Most	of	the	large	infrastructure	
projects	that	have	been	driving	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast’s	economy	have	already	
been	completed,	 including	 the	 stadium	or	 the	LNG	 terminal.	While	 the	 fed-
eral	authorities	are	planning	new	projects	(including	the	museum	and	cultur-
al	complex	in	Kaliningrad	or	a	further	expansion	of	the	road	infrastructure),	
public	spending	will	most	probably	be	lower	than	in	the	last	two	years.	
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In	the	coming	years,	the	energy	and	transport	self-sufficiency	which	the	Ka-
liningrad	Oblast	has	recently	been	pursuing	will	probably	only	serve	to	keep	
the	region	secure	in	the	event	of	rising	tensions	between	Russia	and	its	neigh-
bours,	or	as	a	potential	instrument	to	pressure	its	neighbours.	However,	it	will	
not	 completely	 isolate	 the	 region	nor	 cause	 a	discontinuation	of	 the	 current	
transit	 co-operation	with	neighbouring	countries,	which	 is	much	more	eco-
nomical	for	Russia	than	using	the	maritime	route	for	deliveries	to	the	region.	
Besides,	development	of	good	transport	co-operation	with	Lithuania	and	Po-
land	is	a	necessary	precondition	for	Russia	to	utilise	the	potential	of	the	trans-
port	and	logistics	centres	that	have	been	developed	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	
and	to	succeed	in	the	plans	to	create	a	logistics	and	transport	hub	in	the	region	
to	serve	freight	transport	between	Asia	and	Europe.	
It	is	an	open	question	if	federal	funding	for	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	will	contin-
ue	at	the	current	levels	in	the	coming	years	(in	the	form	of	federal	investments	
or	budget	subsidies),	and	the	answer	will	show	the	extent	to	which	the	Krem-
lin’s	recently	heightened	interest	in	the	region	is	a	permanent	phenomenon.
As	far	as	relations with the outside world are	concerned,	despite	Moscow	
tightening	its	grip	on	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast,	its	EU	neighbourhood	will	con-
tinue	to	influence	the	mentality	and	lifestyles	of	the	Kaliningrad	people,	pro-
moting	openness,	mobility	and	broadly	understood	activity.	This	neighbour-
hood	may	also	be	a	factor	 in	making	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	more	appealing	
in	comparison	to	other	Russian	regions	and	attracting	newcomers	from	other	
parts	of	the	Russian	Federation	and	migrants	from	the	CIS	countries.	
With	Russia	having	implemented	electronic	visas	to	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	in	
July	2019,	 the	 region	may	expect	 an	 increase	 in	 the	number	of	 tourists.	The	
opening	of	 the	deep	sea	 terminal	 in	Pionersky,	which	will	be	able	 to	handle	
large	cruise	ships,	may	also	contribute	to	 increasing	the	number	of	visitors.	
However,	because	of	the	region’s	underdeveloped	tourist	infrastructure,	and	
especially	the	insufficient	hotel	base	and	underfunded	tourist	attractions,	one	
should	not	expect	tourism	to	become	a	driver	for	the	local	economy.	
In	 the	 security sphere, the	 Kaliningrad	 Oblast	 will	 continue	 to	 be	 closely	
watched	by	 the	Russian	secret	 services.	The	need	 to	provide	counter-intelli-
gence	protection	to	the	armed	forces	contingent	deployed	in	the	region	will	be	
a	decisive	factor	in	the	likely	build-up	of	the	FSB	presence.	This	will	negatively	
affect	the	potential	for	the	unrestrained	development	of	contacts	abroad.	The	
oblast	will	remain	an	important	outpost	for	the	Russian	intelligence	services	
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interested	in	carrying	out	operations	in	Poland	and	Lithuania.	As	the	institu-
tion	responsible	for	all	aspects	of	internal	security	in	the	oblast,	the	FSB	will	
have	a	lot	of	say	in	the	implementation	of	the	regional	authorities’	investment	
plans	and	in	the	business	activities	of	individual	actors.
The	activities	taking	place	in	the	Kaliningrad	Oblast	in	the	military sphere	
suggest	that	the	contingent	of	land	and	air	forces	deployed	in	the	exclave	will	
be	enlarged	by	 the	end	of	 this	decade	or	 the	beginning	of	 the	next,	perhaps	
even	to	double	the	current	size.	This	will	be	done	by	expanding	the	existing	
formations	that	remained	in	Kaliningrad	after	the	cuts	in	the	early	2000s,	and	
by	creating	new	units	from	scratch.	The	most	important	aspect	of	this	effort	
concerns	the	re-creation	of	the	structures	of	the	mechanised	division,	which	is	
a	de facto	offensive	unit.	The	transformation	of	the	naval	component	of	the	Bal-
tic	Fleet	deviates	from	this	general	enlargement	trend:	it	is	the	only	military	
unit	that	retains	its	original	size	and	only	undergoes	qualitative	changes.	This	
may	suggest	that	the	role	of	its	operations	on	the	Baltic	Sea	is	seen	as	auxiliary	
to	the	land	and	air	operations	in	the	event	of	a	major	armed	conflict	in	the	Bal-
tic	Sea	region.	
The text was closed in July 2019.
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APPeNdIceS
Appendix 1. Selected social and economic indicators of the Kaliningrad Oblast
2015 2016 2017 2018
Gross regional product (change in %)  -2.5 2.2 2
3.6
(forecast)
Industrial output
(change in %)
-8.8 1.4 1.9 3.1
Agricultural output
(change in %)
10.2 -4.9 0.3 9.1
Construction
(value of work carried out)
(change in %)
10.4 9.2 25.1 43.2
Retail
(change in %)
-6.2 -0.7 1.1 5
Inflation (December to December) 11.7 4.7 2.8 4.8
Investments in share capital
(change in %)
-3.7 15.5 37.4 -3.9
Real incomes
(change in %)
-2.5 -7.5 -1 -1
Real wages (in businesses, change in %) -9.2 -2.9 0.4 4.1
Bank debts of natural persons (jointly, in 
roubles and foreign currencies) under con-
tract in the Kaliningrad Oblast
(beginning of year, RUB billions)
(change in %)
69.4
+17%
7.4
-3%
68.7
+2%
79.9
+16%
(27% increase 
by 1 Jan. 2019)
Unemployment (in %) 5.9 6 5.2 4.6
Regional budget revenues (RUB billions) 59 85.5 111 126
of this, support from the federal budget  
(in % of total budget revenue)
32 51 60 60
Regional budget spending (RUB billions) 70 88 114 124
Surplus/Deficit
(RUB billions)
-11 -2.5 -3 2
Source: Rosstat
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Appendix 2. Economic situation in the Kaliningrad Oblast as compared to the 
rest of Russia (2018)
Kaliningrad Oblast russia
GRP per capita (RUB thousands, 2017) 421.5 510.3
Real income dynamics (change in %) -1 -0.2
Industrial output (change in %) 3.1 2.9
Manufacturing (change in %) 3.6 2.6
Construction (change in %) 43.2 5.3
Retail (change in %) 5 2.6
Inflation (in %) 4.8 4.3
Source: Rosstat
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Appendix 3. Kaliningrad Oblast’s trade co-operation with Poland and Lithuania 
(US$	millions)
2015 2016 2017 2018
Total exports: 2,742 1,239 1,270 1,998
Exports to Poland 117 70 52 101
Exports to Lithuania 93 75 49 64
Total imports: 7,965 5,809 7,209 8,249
Imports from Poland 434 353 388 387
Imports from Lithuania 140 113 117 114
Source: Customs Service of the Kaliningrad Oblast
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Appendix 4. Units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation stationed in 
the Kaliningrad Oblast (as of end of February 2019)
(general military and combat support sub-units and their basic weapons in compli-
ance with the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, CFE are specified 
along with the make-up of the units; colour print signifies units formed and arms 
provided after 1 December 2016)
Central subordination units
 – 1407th Central Artillery Armaments Base – Kaliningrad
Ground Forces (units	reporting	directly	to	the	command	of	the	Western	Mili-
tary	District)
 – 82nd Radio-Engineering Brigade – Primorye (part of the unit, the other part 
is located in the Smolensk Oblast)
 – 841st Radio-Electronic Combat Centre – Yantarny
Aerospace Forces
 – NN. Radio-Technical Node (Voronezh-DM radar station) – Pionersky
 – 26th Measurement Point (Sazhen-TM quantum-optical station, Fazan com-
mand and measurement system)
Naval Forces (Baltic Fleet) 
Maritime	component:
 – 128th Surface Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (two project 11540 frigates, four project 
20380 corvettes equipped with Kalibr missiles; two project 965A destroyer ships 
were withdrawn from service in 2016 – Bespokoyny	was	turned	into	a	museum	
ship	and	Nastoychivy	has	re-entered	service	and	will	be	upgraded	in	2019);
 – 71st Landing Ship Brigade – Baltiysk (four project 775/775M landing ships, 
two project 12322 Zubr air-cushioned landing crafts, two project 21820 
landing boats, three project 11770 boats and one project 1176 landing boat);
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 – 64th Maritime Region Protection Brigade – Baltiysk (146th Anti-Submarine 
Warfare Tactical Group – 6 project 1331M anti-submarine corvettes; 232nd 
Trawler Division – four project 12650 base minesweepers, six project 13000 
and 10750 roadstead minesweepers; 313th Spetsnaz Division);
 – 36th Missile Boat Brigade – Baltiysk (1st Missile Boat Squadron – seven pro-
ject 12411/12411M missile corvettes; 106th Small Missile Ship Squadron – 
four project 12341 missile corvettes; NN Small Missile Ship Squadron – two 
project 21631 missile corvettes; one	project	22800	corvette);	a	second	project	
22800	corvette	to	enter	service	in	2019);
 – 342nd Emergency and Rescue Division – Baltiysk (twelve rescue and fire 
protection units);
 – 72nd Reconnaissance Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (two medium-sized project 
864 reconnaissance ships, two small project 503M reconnaissance ships);
 – 603rd Hydrographic Ship Squadron – Baltiysk (one project 861 hydrographic 
ship, seven hydrographic boats);
 – 51st Hydrographic Service Region – Baltiysk (six hydrographic boats);
 – Group of Supply Units – Baltiysk (eleven auxiliary units, including two 
tankers and eight tugs).
Land component:
 – 336th Naval Infantry Brigade – Baltiysk (two marine infantry battalions, 
one landing and assault battalion, two artillery squadrons; 134 BTR-80/82A 
armoured personnel carriers, eighteen 122 mm 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled 
howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2S9 Nona-S self-propelled howitzers, six 122 mm 
BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers); plans	to	restore	a	tank	battalion;
 – 561st Maritime Reconnaissance Point – Parusnoye (two Spetsnaz companies);
 – 25th Coastal Missile Regiment – Donskoye (two missile squadrons; four Bal 
missile launchers, four	Bastion	missile	launchers);	a	third	missile	squad-
ron	to	be	developed	in	2019	(four	Bal	missile	launchers);
 – NN. Arsenal – Baltiysk.
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Air component:
 – a squadron of anti-submarine helicopters from the 72nd Airbase (eventually 
included in the newly formed helicopter regiment of the 132nd Mixed Air 
Division) – Donskoye (fourteen Ka-27PL/PS anti-submarine helicopters, 
seven	Ka-27M	anti-submarine	helicopters,	three	Ka-29	helicopters).
The contingent of Ground Forces reporting to the Baltic Fleet command
11th	Army	Corps	–	Kaliningrad	–	consisting	of:
–	 11th	Tank	Regiment	–	Gusev	(two	tank	battalions;	sixty-two	T-72B	tanks);	
unit	under	formation;
 – 7th Mechanised Regiment – Kaliningrad (three mechanised battalions, one 
tank battalion, a squadron of self-propelled artillery; 85 BMP-2 infantry 
fighting vehicles, 30 T-72B tanks, eighteen 152 mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-pro-
pelled howitzers, twelve 120 mm 2B16 Nona-K towed howitzers; general 
military battalions with a three-company structure);
 – 79th Mechanised Brigade – Gusev (three mechanised battalions, a tank bat-
talion, two self-propelled artillery squadrons, one missile artillery squad-
ron, one anti-tank artillery squadron; forty-one T-72B tanks, 159 MT-LB ar-
moured personnel carriers, eleven BTR-80 armoured personnel carriers, 
thirty-six 152 mm 2S3 Akatsiya self-propelled howitzers, eighteen 120 mm 
2S12 Sani mortars, twelve 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, 
twelve 100 mm MT-12 Rapira anti-tank cannons; general military battal-
ions with four-company structure);
 – 244th Artillery Brigade – Kaliningrad (one self-propelled artillery squad-
ron, one missile artillery squadron; eighteen 152 mm 2A36 Giatsint-B towed 
howitzers, eighteen 122 mm BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers);
 – 152nd Missile Brigade – Chernyakhovsk (three missile squadrons, twelve	
9K723	Iskander-M	rocket	launchers);
 – 22nd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Kaliningrad (four missile batteries, 
sixteen 9K330 Tor systems).
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Units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 – 69th Engineer Regiment – Gvardeysk;
 – 254th Spetsnaz Radio-Engineering Battalion – Gvardeysk;
 – 134th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 – 135th Communication Battalion – Kaliningrad;
 – 2574th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Guryevsk/Ryabinovka (the	crea-
tion	of	a	mechanised	regiment	is	likely);
 – 2676th Weapons and Ammunition Base – Cherepanovo (the	 creation	 of	
a	mechanised	regiment	is	likely);
 – 2652nd Artillery Weapons and Ammunition Base – Prokhladnoye (the	crea-
tion	of	an	artillery	regiment	is	likely);
 – 148th Repair and Construction Battalion – Kaliningrad.
The contingent of Aerospace Forces reporting to the Baltic Fleet command
44th	Anti-Aircraft	Division	–	Kaliningrad	–	consisting	of:
 – 183rd Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Gvardeysk (five missile squadrons; 
thirty-two	S-400	missile	systems, six 96K6 Pantsir-S1 systems);
 – 1545th Anti-Aircraft Rocket Regiment – Znamensk (three missile squad-
rons; eight	S-400	missile	systems, sixteen S-300W systems); a	second	mis-
sile	squadron	armed	with	S-400	systems	to	be	formed	in	2019;
 – 81st Radio-Engineering Regiment – Pereslavskoye.
Units directly reporting to the Baltic Fleet command:
 – 132nd Mixed Aviation Division – Kaliningrad – consisting of:
–	 4th	 Separate	Naval	 Attack	 Aviation	 Regiment	 –	 Chkalovsk (one bomber-
reconnaissance squadron, one squadron of multi-function fighter aircraft; 
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sixteen Su-24M/Su-24MR bomber and tactical reconnaissance aircraft, 
eight	Su-30M2	multirole	combat	aircraft,	eight	Su-30SM	multirole	combat	
aircraft);
–	 689th	Fighter	Aviation	Regiment	–	Chkalovsk	(two fighter squadrons; four-
teen Su-27/Su-27P/Su-27UP/Su-27UB fighter aircraft, thirteen	 Su-27SM3	
multirole	fighter	aircraft);
 – transport squadron of the 72nd Air Base (undergoing transformation, a heli-
copter regiment of the 132nd Mixed Air Division being formed) – Khrabrovo 
(twelve Mi-24 combat helicopters, eight Mi-8 combat support helicopters, 
three An-26 transport aircraft, two An-140-100 transport aircraft);
 – 81st Communication and Radio-Engineering Battalion – Primorsk/Lunino;
 – 82nd Communication and Radio-Engineering Battalion – Kaliningrad.
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Appendix 5. Expected expansion of general military and support units at bat-
talion/squadron level and their offensive weapons (basic categories as per the 
CFE Treaty) following the creation of a mechanised division in the Kaliningrad 
Oblast
december 2016 February 2019 2021 (forecast)
Number of general military and support units in the 
11th Army Corps and 336th Naval Infantry Brigade
Tank battalion 1/1* 3/1* 8
Mechanised battalion 6 6 13
Naval infantry battalion 2 2 2
Landing and assault 
battalion
1 1 1
Artillery squadron 8 8 13
Number of offensive weapons (basic categories as per CFE Treaty)
Tanks 41 103 299
Armoured fighting 
vehicles
342 342 667
Artillery with calibre of 
100 mm and higher
144 144 234
* tank battalion of the 7th Mechanised Regiment existing as a cadre structure without weapons
